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The Evolutionary Mechanism s of Hybridization in The Current Global 
Environments o f Corporate Governance: Potentia l Stabilities of Hybrid Structures1 
Hideki Take i 
1-1: Introduction 
Corporate governance is an important dimension of management. Appropriat e 
governance practices lead companies to continuously improving prosperity by guiding 
them through environmental uncertainties and the risks of operations, especially 
operations in unfamiliar overseas environments. I n this regard, effective corporate 
governance structures have been critical to the success of multinational enterprise s 
(MNEs) that tend to face higher levels of uncertainty and risk than domestic corporations. 
In addition to the serious uncertainty and risk in international business environments, 
MNEs hav e had to deal with varying and often unfamiliar requests an d values on the part 
of loca l investors and regulatory authorities. Thes e groups frequently define their 
interests and the objectives of their investments on the basis of their own cultural and 
historical background. A s financial market s have globalized, they have also been made 
more complex as a result of encouraging international investors to participate in several 
indigenous and multinational securities markets. 
These various requests, values and demands on the part of international investors or local 
regulatory authorities have often been a drag on the overseas performance of MNEs. 2 
While indigenous governance structures migh t be quite well suited to local values and 
regulatory demands, they are unable to deal with the requests and values of home country 
corporations and their investors. Thi s provides a serious challenge to multinational 
1 Copyrigh t © 2004 by Hideki Takei. 
2 A  typical example is the case of Eli Lill y in Japan. Lill y originally attempted to penetrate the Japanese 
pharmaceutical market through a joint venture with Japanese manufacturer Shionogi Ltd. Th e difference in 
approach to meeting customer and Ministry of Health requirements was s o intense that Lilly was eventually 
forced to dissolve the partnership at a considerable loss. Lilly' s organizational approach and the approac h 
of local companies were so incompatible that no middle ground could be found (Yoshino and Malnight, 
1990). 
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corporations operating in a global sourcing, manufacturing, marketing and financia l 
environment. 
There have been several studies to on the emergence of new corporat e governance 
structure in MNEs. Th e purpose of these studies has primarily been to attempt to 
determine what would be more effective for multinational corporate governance than the 
existing indigenous structures. I n this regard, one of the latest findings is that more 
effective governanc e structures may come about through the emergence o f hybrid 
governance. Hybri d governance is the result of a process whereby indigenous corporate 
governance structures ar e modified to accommodate international requirements, but 
without sacrificing deeply rooted historical and cultural values. I n this regard, it is more 
accurate to speak of "hybridization", or a transformation of governance structure and a 
change in the overall governance paradigm, rather than a simple process of modification. 
A hybri d governance structure is , fundamentally, a new structure which while sensitive to 
local values, nonetheless meets a reasonable international standard o f due diligence. 
Interestingly, some recent studies on hybrid corporate governance (Aoki , 2000) argue 
that the highest level o f corporate performance in MNE's ma y come not from loca l 
governance structures, nor from overseas governance structures o f the developed 
countries but rather from a  hybridized governance system. 
While the superior potential performance o f hybrid structures has been previously argued 
(Aoki, 2000) , there have not been confirmatory studies of actual corporate performanc e 
to date. On e reason for this is that the structure o f emergent hybri d governance has not 
been clearly differentiated from that of more traditional concepts of corporate 
governance. 
In earlie r studies, hybrid models were described as having "semistrong" governance 
attributes fro m differen t types of indigenous corporate and social structures (Williamson , 
1996). B y semi-strong, earlier authors, particularly Williamson, actually mean a system 
where external values are rather arbitrarily grafted onto local governance structures. I n 
theory, this kind of structure draws upon relatively equal amounts fro m the oversea s 
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company's governance environment and the local governance environment. I n terms of 
models, this kind of hybridization is relatively primitive. Whil e these models attempt to 
mix loca l and international values, they do so in an unintegrated or additive fashion. I n 
other words, while they may add governance provisions and requirements in relatively 
equal measure fro m both the loca l system and the international system, there is no 
attempt to integrate these two elements. 
In this case, the principal attributes of semistrong governance models are the result of an 
unstable hybrid model. Th e model is unstable because the process lacks any integrative 
function. A n additional complication in the literature has been that hybrid corporate 
governance models have been traditionally addressed as a transitional phase of 
governance which is, on the whole, assumed to be following a pattern o f global 
convergence (Bradley et al, 1998) . Th e problem here is that convergence is assumed 
rather than demonstrated and this then results in a mischaracterization of the process of 
hybridization, and often in the definition o f a model where the various elements of 
hybridization are inherently unstable (i.e., they are temporary, transitional mechanisms) 
(Williamson, 1996) . 
One consequence of this mischaracterization is that by assuming hybridization is merely 
an intermediate step on the way to global convergence the hybrid model is seen as a 
merely temporary, intermediate process. Williamso n (1996) sees hybrid structures a s the 
"mid-point" on the path to convergence and he envisions a process where, after this mid-
point, hybrid attributes star t disappearing, in order to be replaced by rather unspecified 
"convergent" elements. Clarifyin g thi s process does not, unfortunately, lead to any better 
description of the process of evolution and adaptation in corporate governance structure . 
Where the point of governance has been most clearly articulated (Bradley et al, 1998; 
Logue and Seward, 1999) it turns out that the so-called "point of convergence" is simply 
the Anglo-American, purely contractarian system. Fa r from being a point of 
convergence, this would simply be the imposition of one local system across global 
markets. T o date, recent historical evidence suggests that not only is such an outcome 
improbable (Kester, 1991; Roe, 1999; Aoki, 2000; Gilson, 2001; Licht 2002) but also that 
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the "transaction cost proof o f the universality of shareholder value is, at best, a delusion 
and at worst a pointless triviality (Fellman and Takei, 2003). 3 
1-2: A Different Type of Hybrid Structure 
The stability of the hybrid structure is quite important to ensure the potential 
effectiveness o f the structure because the semistrong attributes as explained by 
Williamson (Williamson, 1996) would be strengthened gradually by both forces arising 
from historica l path dependences and from cultura l values once the hybrid structure is 
stabilized, and after it holds all semistrong attributes (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2002). I n 
other words, i f the hybrid structure behaves in a stable fashion, the governance structure 
may be more effective than indigenous structures, providing that the hybrid structure 
holds all the required governance attributes (for the international capital market) because 
all o f the required investor attributes would be gradually strengthened, without imposing 
impossible constraints on local governance structures. 
While the stability of such hybrid structures is important, there have not been sufficien t 
empirical studies on the stability of hybrid governance structures. Instead , scholars have 
focused on studying the ways in which the transformation of indigenous corporate 
governance structures take place when MNEs se t up local operations as a result o f 
3 Bradle y et al (1998) begin their argument in a relatively straightforward way, by invoking traditional 
transaction cost economics to explain how transaction costs limit the boundaries of the corporation. I n this 
sense, they place transaction costs at the center of the structure of the multinational corporate environment. 
Nothing, in this context, is more important in determining the activities and the profitability of a 
corporation than transaction costs. Havin g established this as the baseline, they then turn to shareholder 
value as the principal driver of corporate activity. Thi s is, to say the least, a bit puzzling, given the fact that 
different societies, different legal structures, and different historical and institutional structures are well 
known to place different values on shareholder democracy, and shareholder and stakeholder returns 
(Kester, 1991). A  very simple example would be the Japanese security market, where there are virtually no 
shareholder dividends and shareholder democracy is not merely unheard of, but actively suppressed 
(Kester, 1991). A t the core of this flawed argument is the assumption that "pursuing the market value rule 
ensures that the values of all stakeholders' claims are maximized" (Bradley et al, 1998). Unfortunatel y the 
authors fail to take into account the fact that in the real world, markets are not perfect, side payments are 
generally constrained by both transaction costs and institutional norms, and with imperfect information, 
local equilibria can never reach Pareto-optimal equilibria (Aoki, 2000). I n short, they argue that in a world 
with no transaction costs, maximizing shareholder value would maximize all stakeholder positions. 
Unfortunately, this contradicts the most basic assumption, which is that transaction costs govern the 
activities and scope of the corporation. 
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market globalization (Fukao, 1999). Thi s kind of study has typically reported the 
characteristics of various transformations and hybridizations of various indigenous 
governance structures without empirically describing the stability of those hybrid 
structures. 
In addition to this difference of focus, students of international corporate governance and 
control face a number of difficulties i n undertaking comparative studies of the 
transformation of local governance structures. Whil e such comparative studies are 
definitely needed, little work has been undertaken in this regard. Nonetheless , such 
studies are necessary in order either to substantiate o r reject existing theories of 
hybridization, since current theory makes strong claims regarding the utility and 
durability of hybridization as a mode of transformation of indigenous governance 
structures (Williamson , 1996). 
Consequently, i f we are to believe in the potential stability of hybrid governance 
structures, we must determine whether there is a hybrid governance structure that holds 
all required attributes fo r global markets which transforms the two indigenous 
governance structures whic h we refer to as polar opposites (i.e. market structures vs. 
hierarchical structures). Withou t such comparative studies between these two polar 
governance structures, i t would be difficult clarif y difference s between the traditional 
way in which hybrid corporate governance structures are described and the more full y 
articulated stable hybrid governance structures which are the subject of this study. 
While the distinction between stable and transitional corporate governance systems is 
central to the current study, it is important to understand that in earlier studies, 
particularly those dating from the 1990's , it may have been difficult t o make this 
distinction since at that time there were not many examples of these two polar 
governance structures whic h now make up the empirical core of the present comparative 
study. I n other words, part of the issue is theoretical, but part of the issue relates to the 
fact that in the twenty-first century globalization has pushed U.S., Japanese, an d German 
governance systems to move towards some kind of stable hybrid structure . 
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Fortunately, we now know that current hybrid governance structures are an output of the 
hybridization which has taken place between market-driven governance structures (such 
as the U.S. governance structure4) and relational governance structures (such as the 
Japanese and German corporate governance structures5 (Guillen , 2000; McDonnell, 
2002). While there are many countries belonging to a cluster centered one or another of 
these two indigenous structures, the hybridization of corporate governance structures in 
large MNEs i n U.S.A., Japan, and Germany due to globalization is the central concern of 
this writing. 
While OECD report s have not discussed the stability of hybrid structures, they have 
argued that MNEs wit h a U.S. style governance structure have nonetheless attempted in 
recent years to acquire some of the values of Japanese and German governance 
structures. I n the same vein while MNEs wit h Japanese and German structures have 
aggressively tried to adopt the governance values of the U.S., such efforts have been less 
than entirely successful (Bradley et al , 1998) . Thes e general observations regarding 
hybrid governance structure suggest that a hybrid structure might be a more stable middle 
point for Japanese and German corporate governance structures. 
This dissertation aims at clarifying the stability of current and emerging corporate 
governance structures in MNE's wit h special attention to large corporations in the 
U.S.A., Japan, and Germany. Sinc e the existence, and indeed the desirability of hybrid 
structures appears to have been generally accepted, this dissertation will focuse s 
particularly on the potential stability of hybrid corporate governance forms. 
I begin with a description of the current environment and changes brought about through 
globalization on indigenous governance structures o f MNEs. I n these descriptions, I 
narrow the discussion to the three most important specific indigenous governance 
structures (i.e. , those o f the U.S, Japan and Germany). Th e U.S. governance structure is 
4 U.S . governance structure is also called as the Anglo-American governance model. Sometimes , the 
Anglo-American governance model i s called as the contractarian governance model. 
5 Th e relational governance model i s also called as the communitarian governanc e model. 
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classified a s the contractarian mode and the Japanese and German governance structure s 
are classified a s the communitarian mode. Consequently , at the end of this description, 
we will trea t with two polar governance structures (i.e . contractarian and communitarian; 
or market-oriented vs. hierarchy and relational oriented) that we would be observing as 
hybridized during the current round of globalization of product and capital markets. 
Then, I start discussing the general trends of globalizations of the indigenous governance 
structures. These discussions include both theoretical discussions and empirical 
arguments. Th e theoretical discussions are mainly traditional theories relating to 
hybridization and the hybrid structures of corporate governance. Suc h theories include 
four ways of describing globalization, (1) convergence theories, (2) non-convergence 
arguments, (3) path dependence theory , and (4) hybrid governance theory. Th e 
empirical discussion which follows primarily relates to the OECD governance model that 
has been typically considered appropriate for modeling the emerging hybrid governance 
structures whic h contain both the communitarian and contractarian structures (Guillen , 
2000). 
Following this discussion, I compare the OECD governance model to Oliver 
Williamson's governance model in order to make some fundamental distinctions between 
the theoretical description of hybrid governance structures and the actual emerging 
hybrid structures. Followin g this, I begin the discussion regarding the potential stability 
of the OEC D governance model as a result of the path dependence. Then , I introduce 
Masahiko Aoki's A-J-P statistical model of comparative corporate governance and his 
use of the Pareto-optimum equilibrium. 
At the end of the discussion, I build a new hybrid integrated governance model (HIG) as 
a stable OECD governance model. Consequently , the HIG model is an empirical form of 
the OECD governance model. HI G represents both an advance in the theory of 
comparative corporate governance and control as well as being supported by a wide 
range of empirical observations. Th e empirical data on the HIG model is then used for 
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the confirmation of the stability of the OECD governance model in this modified for m 
(HIG) through field stud y with MNEs fro m the U.S. , Japan, and Germany. 
After discussin g the results of the field study , I explain the nature and importance of 
stability to HIG. A s the theory leads us to believe, HIG i s indeed a stable form o f the 
more general model initially proposed by the OECD . 
1-3: Goal s of this Dissertation with respect to the Field of International Business 
Explaining HIG a s a stable version of the OECD governance model is the main goal of 
both my empirical study and my theoretical research to develop new explanations of the 
current hybrid governance structure. Th e theoretical elaboration of HIG as a more 
complete model of the OECD hybri d governance structure is an important addition to the 
comparative study of corporate governance. Empirica l confirmation gives us the 
confidence that HIG does , in fact, better explain the current processes o f hybridization 
better than existing models (i.e. the Williamson governance model). 
One of the most important elements of system transformations i s the search for greater 
competitive fitness by transforming systems. I n most cases, it is generally understood 
that the new systems wil l be functional only i f the systems have both the fundamenta l 
capacity for satisfying requirements in the market place as well as the specific capability 
for dealing with indigenous requirements in different markets (www.insead.fr, 2004). 
Hence the stability of the new system is a central issue with respect to competitive fitness 
because the new system cannot utilize the more efficient properties arising from th e 
process of globalization unless the system is stable. 
Two of the most difficult issue s regarding stabilizations are historical dependence an d the 
persistence of cultural values because these values are so strongly held that they are 
locked-in such a way that they become major obstacles for obtaining or holding new 
values from differen t systems. Consequently , knowing the leve l o f persistence for 
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traditional values and understanding the barriers which need to be overcome in order to 
gain acceptances fo r the new values by indigenous systems is critical for success. 
There have been numerous arguments abou t the hybridization of various indigenous 
values in corporate governance (Williamson, 1996 ; Subramani et al , 1999 ; Sheard, 2002). 
The school of thought followin g Licht , Gilson etc, which is based upon the theory of path 
dependence, examines the stability of hybrid structure. Buildin g on the work of Arthur 
(1989, 1990 , and 1994) and then Aoki (200 0 and 2003) I use the results of my empirical 
study to explain the strong competitive fitness of stable hybrid structures, which typically 
occur after the initia l hybridization. 
2: Market Globalization 
Recent market globalization has influenced the practices and the performance of 
indigenous corporate governance systems. Cross-border relationships among various 
corporations from different regions have profoundly affected these markets. Becaus e of 
the scope and pace of recent globalization, these systems tend to face a number of serious 
difficulties i n satisfying the different requests and values which emanate from outside 
participants in cross-border business relations. Thi s conflict i s especially intense because 
the fundamental values and goals of indigenous governance structures ar e generally 
based upon very different historical dependencies, cultural values, and institutional 
structures than those of global organizations (MNEs). I n comparison to modern global 
organizations, these indigenous systems are generally quite ineffective for good 
operational decisions and for financing corporate activities through international financial 
markets. 
While the indigenous structures woul d be stil l effective in international markets i f the 
indigenous structure could maintain the original values and successfully interact with the 
global environment. However , this is not observed in practice because of historical 
persistence (i.e . path dependent lock-in of institutions) and barriers to the acquisition of 
the different global values. Consequently , indigenous governance structures have had to 
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try to find way s to interact wit h global markets possessing differen t values . Mos t 
commonly, this results i n either a  "structural" failure or else a fragmented econom y in 
which a  small sector of corporations hybridiz e and compete globall y while t he bulk of 
the economy stagnates locally. 
In this chapter, I describe the process o f the globalization of markets i n order to 
understand ho w it has influenced indigenous corporate managemen t practices an d 
indigenous structure for corporate governanc e an d control. 
2-1: Th e Globalization of Markets in the Developed Countries 
The globalization of corporate governanc e typicall y occurs in companies that have t o 
control operational an d financial decisions in cross-border busines s relations . I f we look 
at the current roun d of restructuring i n indigenous systems, w e find change most 
commonly tends to occur in MNEs with headquarters in developed countries. Thi s is 
generally believed to be the result o f the greater intensity of global competition in 
developed countries . 
For example, in 1999, foreign direct investment (FDI ) inflows to developed countrie s 
reached a t $636 billion. Thi s is $156 billion more than the FDI numbers fo r 1998 and 
approximately 75% of the world's total FDI. FD I outflows from developed countrie s 
maintained relatively high levels, but the growth of outflows declined as the result of 
negative economi c developments i n Asia such as the Asian currency crisis of 1997 (UN , 
2000). 
While the globalization of the markets appear s to have been steadily advancing, there 
have only been a  few critical players contributing to the actual growth of FDI. Generally 
speaking, the U.S.A. , the U K , France , Germany, and Japan have been responsible fo r the 
bulk of FDI activities. 6 
6 Th e U.S.A. and the U K had been the leaders in FDI. Tota l FDI inflows between the U.S . and the EU 
dramatically increased in 199 9 eve n though the inflows doubled from 1998 . Th e EU also played major role 
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Japan became a popular region for FDI inflow s followin g liberalizatio n and deregulation 
of the financia l sector . Fo r example, FDI inflow s to Japan reached $13 billion i n 1999 as 
compare to only $3 billion i n 1998 (UN, 2000). 
In examing the effects o f globalization on developed countries, I choose the U.S.A. , 
Germany, and Japan because these three countries are not only the leaders but also 
because they have been the subjects of comparative studies in corporate governance and 
control (Bradley et al, 1998) . I n the following sections , I describe the details of market 
globalization in these three countries. 
2-2: A  General Descriptions of Product Market Globalizations in the U.S. , Japan, 
and German y 
According to the United Nations (2000), there were nine major industries for the top 100 
MNEs i n 1998. These nine industries are: (1) electronics/electrical equipment/computers, 
(2) motor vehicle and parts, (3) petroleum exploration/refining/distribution and mining, 
(4) food/beverages/tobacco, (5 ) chemicals, (6) pharmaceuticals, (7) diversified, (8 ) 
telecommunications, and (9) trading. These industries can be characterized as capital and 
knowledge intensive with sensitive financial requirements as well a s the need to raise 
large working capital in global markets. 
In globa l product markets, 55 firms out of the world's 100 largest MNEs i n 1998 were 
from the U.S. , Germany , and Japan. Thei r shares in the total value of foreign assets for 
the top 10 0 MNEs reache d at 60% in 1998. 
U.S. corporations have dominated the world's 100 largest MNEs. For example, there 
were 28 U.S. firms in 1990, 27 U.S. firms in 1997, 26 U.S. firms in 1998. Genera l 
Electric in electronics/electrical equipment/computers industries and General Motors in 
in global FDI. Fo r example, FDI inflows to the E U were approximately $305 billion; this was a  23% 
increase over 1998. Amon g EU members , France and Germany led the other members (UN, 2000). 
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motor vehicle and parts industries were respectively number one and number two in the 
100 MNEs i n 1998. I n addition, there were another 2 4 U.S. firms on the same list. 
Industries i n which these firms are active include electronics, motor vehicles, retailing, 
petroleum, chemicals, and utilities (UN, 2000). 
In additio n to the U.S . dominating global markets, the growth of total foreign assets for 
U.S. firms has constantly increased . Fo r example, the total foreign assets of U.S. firms in 
the top 10 0 MNEs wa s 31.5% in 1990, 32.4% in 1997, and 32.9% in 1998. Whil e the 
growth rate between 199 0 and 199 8 was only 1.4%, U.S . firms have constantly adde d 
foreign assets to already substantial foreign asset base (UN, 2000). 
German firms also frequently appea r in the world's 100 largest MNE s (UN , 2000). Fo r 
example, there were 9 German MNEs i n 1990, 11 German MNEs i n 1997, and 12 
German MNEs i n 1998. Particularl y noteworthy were DaimlerChrysler (9 t h) and the 
Volkswagen Group (11t h), two of the largest German MNEs. Majo r industrie s in which 
German MNEs ar e active include motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals/chemicals, and 
electronics. 
The growth of the total foreign assets of German MNEs ha s likewise been constantly 
increasing. Fo r example, the total of foreign assets of German MNEs i n the top 10 0 was 
8.9% in 1990, 12.7% in 1997, and 12.6 % in 1998 (UN, 2000). Germa n MNEs hav e ofte n 
occupied critical leadership segments in global markets. 
There are 1 7 Japanese companies among the world's 100 largest MNE s i n 1998 (UN , 
2000). Th e number o f Japanese firms in the world's 100 largest MNE s ha s grown from 
12 firms in 1990 to 1 7 firms in 1997 and 1998 . The 17 firms include Toyota (6th) and 
Honda (18 th). Th e major industries in which large Japanese MNEs ar e key players are 
motor vehicles, electronics, and trading. 
Japanese MNEs hav e maintained their portions in the total of foreign assets of the top 
100 MNEs sinc e 1990 . Fo r example, the total Japanese portion was 12 % in 1990, 15.7% 
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in 1997 , and 14.5 % in 1998 (UN, 2000). Japanese MNEs hav e also taken strong 
leadership positions in global markets . 
2-3: Globalizatio n o f Equity Markets i n the U.S. , Japan, and Germany through 
Cross-Border Merger s an d Acquisitions 
Large MNEs hav e generally preferred merger s and acquisitions to "organic growth" (UN, 
2000). On e reason that cross-border mergers and acquisitions are preferred i s because 
MNEs expec t both faster business growth and more rapid increase in proprietary assets 
through the cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UN, 2000). Suc h proprietary assets 
include research and development, technical know-how, patents, goodwill, local licenses, 
and distribution networks. Suc h assets would otherwise require MNEs t o spend a long 
time and great effort i n developing by themselves. 
While above mentioned benefits have driven much of the M NE preference fo r cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, these preferences hav e been further enhance d by better 
conditions for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Thi s is primarily the result of two 
factors: (1) the liberalization and deregulations of capital markets and (2) the emergence s 
of advanced information technologies allowing connectivity between differen t loca l 
capital markets through global information networks (UN, 2000). 
Nationally based or nationally headquartered MNE' s fac e a new problem with the 
globalization of capital markets and that is the introduction of overseas equit y holders. 
With the presence o f overseas equity holders, the board must either learn to accommodate 
the values of those equity holders or otherwise face a challenge to management's contro l 
of the firms ' assets . Th e United Nations (2000) summarized this process as follows . 
It appears also that the increasing globalization of capital markets is 
contributing to a certain convergence of different system s of corporate 
governance and financing patterns. On e identification of this is the 
increased acceptance o f mergers an d acquisitions around the world. A s 
noted earlier, the United States and the United Kingdom remain the most 
active countries with regard to mergers and acquisitions, but the incidence 
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of takeovers has also increased in both continental Europe and Japan. Th e 
frequency o f mergers and acquisitions also raises questions related to 
corporate governance, including as regards the protection of minority 
shareholders and the role of other stakeholders (UN, 2000). 
This statement of U N implie s "certain convergence" towards more market-driven 
governance systems and away from the communitarian governance practices with their 
emphasis on stakeholder value. However , it is important to notice that these convergence 
arrangements do not necessarily mean complete convergence to a market-driven 
governance structure. Th e UN report made an effort to clearly point out the importance 
of the fai r treatment of both minority shareholders and stakeholders. 
In same ways the UN's statemen t is simply reflective of the power balances between 
U.S., German, and Japanese MNEs i n cross-border mergers and acquisitions. I n other 
words, they anticipate a general tendency for governance transitions towards market-
driven systems primarily because the U.S. MNE s who maintain market-driven 
governance structures have been the dominant players in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. A s a result, Japanese and German MNEs have to some degree had to 
acquire market-driven values even in their indigenous governance structures i n order to 
profitably interact with U.S. MNEs . However , since Japanese and German MNEs ar e 
also powerful players in the global M &A market, the relational values of corporat e 
governance (i.e. stakeholder values, relational financing, etc.) have been also observed in 
the international M &A market. 
These arguments ar e supported by a list detailing the origins of the MNEs wh o have 
participated in recent large cross-border M &A deals. Fo r example, the 1 9 MNEs that 
participated in the largest 50 cross-border deals which were completed during 1987-1999 
were primarily from the U.S.A., Japan, and Germany. Deal s by 19 of these firms 
accounted for 38% of total of the largest 50 cross-border M &A deals. Additionally , 23 
companies acquired in the top 50 cross-border M &A deals (1987-1999) were also from 
these three nations. Thi s activity accounts for approximately half of the total of the 50 
largest cross-border M &A deals (UN, 2000). 
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U.S. MNE s le d cross-border M &A deals during this period. Ther e were 1 0 U.S. 
acquirers participating in the top 50 cross-border M &A deals (1987-1999) and 1 9 U.S. 
acquired firms in the same deals (UN, 2000). 
German MNE s hav e also participated actively in the top 50 cross-border M &A deals 
(1987-1999). Ther e were 7 German acquirers in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
and 2 German acquired firms in the same deals. Amon g German participants, there were 
5 firms which appeared i n the 20 largest MNEs wit h active cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (UN, 2000). 
While Japanese securities markets have generally been regarded as inefficient for cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, there were, nonetheless, 2  Japanese acquires and 2 
Japanese acquired firms in the top 50 cross-border M &A deals (1987-1999). Whil e there 
are only 2 acquired Japanese corporations, Japanese companies have been increasingly 
viewed as attractive targets for cross-border mergers and acquisitions because o f the 
increased liquidity of Japanese securities markets brought about by a series of 
deregulations and liberalization of the market. Fo r example, by the year 1999 , Japan 
becomes the 9 t h largest target for cross-border mergers and acquisitions (UN, 2000). A 
good example of this is the acquisition of Japan's Lon g Term Credit Bank by U.S. led 
investor group. 
The U N report (2000) also described some interesting characteristics of Japanese 
participation in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Accordin g to the US report, the 
number of Japanese firms acquired by foreign MNEs ha s exceeded those purchased by 
Japanese MNEs sinc e 1997 . Thi s trend in Japanese cross-border mergers and acquisition 
activities has primarily been caused by the Japanese long-term economic recession. 
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3: A General Description of Recent Changes in the Corporat e Governanc e of MNEs 
3-1: A  General Description of the Current Changes in Corporate Governanc e of 
MNEs in Developed Countries 
As described previously, the current process of globalization in both product and 
financial market s has facilitated a kind of convergence towards market-driven corporate 
governance structures (Guillen , 2000). Fuka o (1999) argues that such movements have 
emerged as the result of the ways in which the globalization of markets has seriously 
limited the performance o f indigenous firms. I n a more general sense, this is a product of 
the fact that local firms which cannot globalize are characterized by governance structur e 
that reflect their traditional values, a result o f historical path dependence. Thes e firms 
then have a low fitness leve l when competing against globalized MNEs . 
Again, while the general tendency of transitions in governance systems have been 
towards market-driven governance practices (Guillen, 2000), there is also considerable 
evidence of non-convergence (Licht , 2001; Gilson, 2001). Hirat a (2003) explains the 
reasons fo r this situation by citing three influences of globalization on MNEs' corporat e 
governance systems . 
First, he argued that the current high intensity of globalization in both product and 
financial market s has brought different management value s and strategic objectives to the 
governance of indigenous corporations. Suc h changes, whic h he described as value 
migrations, are caused by the globalization of the board of directors (Esser, 2001). 
Globalizing the board reflects the fact that approximately 15% of investment portfolios 
and institutional investments have gone to the cross-border investments. Naturally , these 
global investment activitie s have globalized not only the shareholder composition but 
also director composition because larg e foreign investors have a built in incentive to 
place their representatives o n corporate boards in order to protect their investments. 
Consequently, appearances o f the foreign directors in MNEs hav e gradually increased. 
21 
Companies with three or more foreign directors increased from 1 1 percent 
in 199 3 to over 23 percent i n 1998. Th e globalization of the board is truly 
underway Europ e and North America lead the trend toward global 
boards. Mos t of the companies seek directors outside their regions, with 
very different cultura l and business backgrounds. (Esser , 2001). 
However, t he globalization of the board is not unproblematic. I n a number of cases, th e 
difference i n corporate value s and historical perspectives ca n damage existin g corporate 
governance structure s becaus e consensus building , strategic planning and decision-
making in general may become quite difficult . Th e introduction of foreign directors may 
cause serious internal conflicts between native and foreign directors i f their original 
values and culture are significantly different . 
For example, Krug and Nigh (1998) noted that: 
.. .greater cultural distance lead s to greater number of executive departures 
... cultura l differences undermin e communications and the leve l of 
cooperation between merging top management teams . Th e negative effec t 
of culture is, however, significantly reduced when the foreign 
multinational has international experience (Krug and Nigh, 1998) . 
Another area o f potential value conflict comes from the globalization o f information . 
Advanced information technologies have supported internationa l investors' activism by 
allowing them to reach new information for investment decisions and planning (Hirata, 
2003). Suc h informed international investors are not only able to make appropriat e 
decisions and timely transactions i n capital markets (Monk s and Minow, 2000; Torre and 
Moxon, 2001) but they become increasingly able to pressure board decisions by rapidly 
dumping stock whenever they fin d board decisions not to be in their best interests a s 
investors (disclosure effects) . 
Disclosure effects ar e especially important for international investors who undertak e 
transactions i n highly liquid equity markets because the availability of information make s 
equity transactions i n such markets faste r and more complex but also more transparent 
due to universal connectivity (Evans and Wurster, 1997) . 
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The appearance and influence of such international investors has continued to increase a s 
Monks and Minow (2000) describe below. 
By 1994 , foreign investors accounted for more than one percent o f tota l 
world stock market capitalization. Thi s figure has not since been 
exceeded, although the flow o f funds acros s national borders has shown a 
consistent rise (Monks and Minow, 2000). 
International investor s who have efficient information networks and sufficient financia l 
powers to influence multinational equity markets and transactions hav e further polarize d 
global M N E ' s fro m firms run with indigenous governance system s driven by local, path 
dependent, institutional and cultural values. 
Put simply local firms which are bound by path dependent lock-in are generally both 
unwilling and unable to hybridize their governance and hence their operations. Thi s 
means that even without formally restricted access to international capital markets the y 
remain unable to tap international capital markets. Thi s has a doubly dampening effec t 
on th e firms  performance . 
First, they are limited to local capital markets, which are generally unable to supply 
equity capital in either the volume or at rates competitive with international markets . 
This means that capital-rationing effects wil l profoundly inhibit the growth of indigenous 
firms as compared to MNEs . 
Secondly, because they operate in an environment constrained by indigenous values and 
institutions, they are unable to earn a competitive returns when compare to MNE s 
engaging in commerce in the same substantive areas . Thi s means that wherever a 
country is partially globalized, the MNEs wil l ultimately drive the purely indigenous 
firms out of business. 
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The influenc e of international investors has motivated both institutions and corporations 
to adopt new modes of governance in order to tap global product and capital markets. I n 
many cases, the principles of corporate governance elaborated by the OECD hav e been 
the guiding examples for changes in the governance models of various countries 
possessing well capitalized MNC's. However , unlike the view put forth by convergence 
advocates, who argue that these changes are merely the intermediate stage of a process 
which must ultimately converge to Anglo-American norms, these new governance 
structures have instead tended to follow a  pattern whose endpoint is typically not 
convergence, but rather, hybridization. 
In other words, instead of taking the Anglo-American contractarian system of corporate 
governance to be a one-size-fits-all model , the guiding principles have been recognized 
more nearly as guidelines for MNE's wit h respect to the parts of their operations which 
can b e changed to match those of the headquarters (Eli Lilly) . Whil e they are not 
necessarily evidence of global, or even regional convergence, the OECD guidin g 
principles are generally quite carefully considerin g as important benchmarks by 
companies who must move away from various indigenous values in order to satisfy 
international investors (Monks and Minnow, 2000). 
For example , according to the OECD principles , MNE's shoul d demonstrate a respect for 
shareholder value. I n particular, the corporate board should be the ombudsman for the 
protection of shareholders, shareholder property rights, and should actively work to 
improve the disclosure and transparency, and accountabilities of the board (Guillen, 
2000). 
Similar to the OEC D principles , the International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN) emphasizes five shareholders' rights: informed judgments, voting rights, 
disclosure and transparency, one-share-one-vote principle , and a fiduciary  obligation for 
voting institutional investors (Monks and Minnow, 2000; ICGN, 2003). 
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In addition to these guiding principles, several professionals have suggested additional 
governance elements fo r MNE's. Fo r example, Choe (1998) suggested that M N E ' s ' 
governance practices should maintain board independence, an adequate set of internal 
controls, and organizational and financial transparency . Tateish i (2001) stated that higher 
levels of transparency, accountability, information disclosure, and business ethics were 
the universal elements of MNE's governance . 
McRitchie (2002) built five universal elements based upon democracy at the workplace 
as basis of governance in global markets. Thes e elements are (1) shareholder 
participation and proportional representation; (2) an emphasis on voting rights; (3) 
effective communication ; (4) an emphasis on relational shareholders, and (5) strong 
board independence based on an independent power resource for directors. 
In sum, four critical, or "universal" elements can be used to characterize globalized 
governance principles. Thes e elements reflect both contractarian and communitarian 
values. First , from the contractarian point of view, it is important to respect shareholders ' 
property rights and voting rights. Second , disclosure and transparency must be 
maintained at high level . Third , board accountabilities must be ensured by high levels of 
board independence and a strong respect for the director's fiduciary duties. Finally , 
information and relational efficiencies must be maintained through efficient information 
flows, interaction , and communications. 
Third, powerful relational investors have actually facilitated the value migrations in 
M N E ' s ' corporat e governance structures. Sin e relational investors hold large portions of 
equities for long-term and monitor and supervise operations and governance o f the 
corporation in which they invest (Bhagat et al, 2002), relational investors mix the values 
of market-driven systems and relational systems (Hirata, 2003). I n general, since there 
have not been generally accepted principles of governance which incorporate both 
contractarian and communitarian values of governances, large relational investors each 
establish their own corporate governance principles with respect to equity investments 
(Guillen, 2000; CalPERS, 2003). 
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Relational investors have influenced governance practices in U.S. and European nations 
as Bhagat et al (2002) described below. 
In th e las t decade, a  substantial academic and popular literature has argued 
that American corporations focus too much on near-term profitability , an d 
that their long-term performance migh t improve if they had long-term 
investors ["relationa l investors"] . .. . A recent repor t to the European 
Commission concludes that 'strong block-holders' are a major impedimen t 
to good corporate governance o f European companies (Bhagat et al, 
2002). 
Generally speaking, since powerful relational investors primarily come from the U.S . 
market, relational investors tend to reflect the market-driven values. As a result, their 
requests for long-term relationships and long-term returns from their investments reflec t 
the market-driven values of shareholder welfare protection (Bhagat et al, 2002). Fo r 
example, relational investors may intentionally invest in under-performing long-term 
projects i f they expect that such projects woul d increase short-term profitability . 
However, relational investors have undertaken ver y similar actions to selective 
intervention in communitarian governance systems . Generally , the appear to consider 
these interventions as a substitute fo r mergers and acquisition activities because they 
establish long-term financial  relationships with MNE's i n order to gain continuous 
profitable returns on investment throug h participation in the business operations o f th e 
MNE's . Suc h intervention is designed to improve the M N E ' s overal l financial 
performance (Kester , 1991; Milhaupt, 1996 ; Bhagat et al , 2002). 
3-2: A  General Description of the Curren t Influences on U.S. Corporat e 
Governance 
According to Esser (2001), US firms have had to finance large amount o f working capital 
in global equity markets a s they have globalized. Sinc e investors tend to vary from 
country to country in global equity markets, the globalization o f U.S. boards has also 
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increased. Fo r example, currently, more than 23 percent o f US corporations have three or 
more foreign directors on their boards (Esser,  2001). 
Since foreign directors and investors have a variety of different interest s an d values, their 
presence o n the board often influence s U.S . management an d gr ^nc e practices. I n 
particular, directors from large foreign institutional investors h e d the U.S . 
corporations to reflect their own values and interests a s a result of their large financia l 
powers. A t the same time, U.S. corporations have begun to recognize the importance of 
adopting new values in order to attract foreign investors and more generally to reduce th e 
cost of capital in global markets (Lightfoo t and Kester, 1991; Salmon, 1993; Hamilton, 
2000; Esser, 2001). 
Relational investors who have long-term perspectives and who participate in the 
governance o f the firms in which they invest in order to protect their interests hav e forced 
U.S. firms to respect no t only short-term profits but also long-term profits and to place a 
greater emphasis on long-term strategic planning (Hamilton, 2000; Bhagat et al, 2002; 
Sheard, 2002). 
The emergence o f relational investors has also forced U.S. corporations to change som e 
of their business decision criteria. Generall y speaking, U.S. firms tend to make decisions 
primarily to maximize shareholder value . Relational investors, however, have forced 
management t o consider stakeholder welfare as well, particularly when those relational 
investors are stakeholders fo r the U.S . firms. I n such situations, the pension funds an d 
other relational equity investors try to protect both returns on their investments an d the 
returns for the equity holders of the pension funds s o that the pension funds can protect 
both long-term returns and financial stabilit y (Bradley et al , 1998). 7 
Since relational investors try to monitor and supervise governance practices and strategi c 
plans as insiders (Bhagat et al, 2002), U.S. corporations have had to include long-term 
relational practices in their governance policies . This means that U.S. firms must not only 
7 Thi s is commonly known as the fiducially duties of the pension fund. 
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have efficient disclosure to outsiders but also high levels of transparency an d information 
sharing for internal monitors. 
3-3: Recen t Changes in the U.S . Corporate Governance System 
As previously discussed, U.S. corporate governanc e ha s had to attempt to satisfy a variety 
of investor requests and relational values that contractarian governance values on their 
own cannot satisfy . Whil e U.S. companies have tried to change their governanc e 
structures to satisfy these different values , they face four obstacles i n doing so, these are: 
(1) incomplete contracts, (2) externalities, (3) the complexity of cross-borde r 
transactions, an d (4) difficulties wit h social welfare maximization (Bradley et al, 1998) . 
If we follow the structuralis t explanation of contractarian governance as elucidated by 
Bradley et al (1998), we can easily see the difficulties whic h a purely contractarian 
system has in ordering with the interests of stakeholders an d other residual claimants. 
First, since U.S. corporations are viewed as bundles of contracts o f all participants, U.S . 
governance practices are inherently restricted within the terms of these contracts (Monk s 
and Minow, 2000). Generall y speaking, since equity investors are the most importan t 
residual claimants, they have had the greater bargaining power with respect to this bundle 
of contracts. Hence , U.S. corporations have primarily tried to maximize shareholder 
welfare and it is this interest whic h tends to dominate both their operations an d their 
corporate governanc e practices . 
While U.S. firms may respect the contractual nexus, they cannot full y satisf y all 
shareholder interest s because there is no complete contract describing every possible 
situation. Additiona l constraints on the efficiency an d completeness o f the contractaria n 
approach may also arise as the result of bounded rationality and information asymmetry. 
In addition, such contract-based busines s operations and governance practices are not 
acceptable i n regions where mutual relationships and long-term collaborations have been 
emphasized. Fo r example, in such communitarian regions, general agreements are made 
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before contract s are sighed. Thi s is done to ensure long-term business relations and 
continuous collaboration within the framework of a general agreement. Genera l 
agreements are typically more flexible and more tolerant of unexpected busines s 
situations and unusual events i n business operations . 
Bradley et al (1998) also describe the limitations of contractarian governance system s 
from the practical point of view. They argue that complete contracts cannot be 
constructed not only because o f bounded rationality but also because o f language 
problems and the lack of universally accepted criteria for evaluating the contracts . 
The incompletenes s of contracts is one basic limitation of U.S . corporat e governance . 
Also in different regions with various other cultures and histories, relational investors 
have seriously concerns about the agency problems in contractarian systems whic h occur 
between investor s (principals) and management (agents) . 
In an effort t o solve these agency problems, large overseas shareholder s elec t some 
number of directors to serve as their representatives. Th e board is expected to solve 
information asymmetry and self-dealing problems by gaining corporate information 
directly from management . Whil e the directors are expected to function as a bridge 
between the shareholders an d the managers i n order to solve agency problems, such 
problems will not be completely solved unless the directors can go beyond mere contract s 
and collections of corporate information freely (Monks and Minow, 2000). 
As I  described, while the directors are expected to monitor and supervise the managemen t 
to ensure shareholde r welfare and interest withi n the terms of contracts, they are not 
effective monitor s for situations that are not written in the contracts. I n addition, there 
will not be complete contracts to describe such unexpected conditions. Consequently , 
such incomplete contracts tend to give some rooms for the self-dealings and the 
opportunisms o f the agents when there are unexpected or unwritten situations are 
happening. 
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Second, the externality makes the society's resource allocation inefficient when mutually 
beneficial contract s fo r all stakeholders are not made. Whe n some parties cannot receive 
benefits, the parties become externalities to damage al l contracts. Thi s externality 
problem is more serious when a corporation does not have mechanism to solve the 
problem. Efficient corporat e governance mechanism can reduce the externality by 
interest alignments among the stakeholders . 
This becomes serious problem when foreign investors and foreign directors participate 
into the U.S. governance systems because they may not be tolerant for such unbalanced 
distributions of interests an d resources. Especially , the relational investors are not 
tolerant to the unfairness because their traditional governance values emphasis on 
fairness and equalities. 
The relational investors are also fiduciaries who are responsible for their investors and 
employees. Generall y speaking, while there are two different types of the pension funds , 
the private pension funds ar e the largest group of institutional investors (Monks and 
Minow, 2000). Th e private pension funds are governed by laws called as ERIS A 
(http://www.benefitslink.com/erisa, 2003) . ERIS A i s to encourage private firms to create 
pension plans for their employees and to protect their investments i n the plans. ERIS A 
allows the trustees of the private pension funds to be the non-neutral fiduciaries who wil l 
have conflicts in interesting because settlers and beneficiaries are both employees and 
employers (Monks and Minow, 2000). 
Consequently, the trustees are serious about total returns on their investments since 
fiduciary dutie s to the pension plan participants are set to high levels. Fo r example, 
incompetent trustees may pay a fine for the poor performances, be eternally prohibited 
from managing pension funds, or even go to prisons (Monks and Minow, 2000). 
In addition, SEC reformed proxy-voting system based upon more communitarian 
information sharing and interactions. SEC's reforms o f the proxy voting systems in 1992 
8 Thes e are public pension funds and private pension funds. 
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aimed at improvements i n the voting effectiveness throug h better communication and 
information flows between th e management an d the shareholders wh o have no intentions 
to control the firms.  Suc h SEC's reforms minimiz e the agency problems and ensure 
balanced distribution of resources an d interests throug h information sharing and 
consensus (Choi , 2000). 
Third, cross-border transactions i n various markets wit h different tradition s and cultures 
make the U.S . governanc e syste m for less effective than it might be for purely domestic 
US. corporations . A s the U N (2000 ) report states, while U.S. firm s lead FDI inflow s and 
outflows in global markets, the U.S . governanc e syste m which is based on market-driven 
values tends to create obstacles fo r the cross-border transactions, especiall y in more 
communitarian markets. Thi s means that not only are there conflicts in governance 
practices when U.S. corporation s enter foreign markets but different loca l regulatory 
environments an d government interventio n which is for more common in communitarian 
systems als o lead to conflicts. 
Finally, there are significant differences i n the meaning of economic efficiency between 
the contractarian values and the communitarian values. Naturally , such differences ar e 
reflected to the ways of improvements of the efficiency. Generall y speaking, 
contractarian governance practices try to maximize economic efficiency by improving the 
market efficiency because the efficiency of the market is the most importan t economic 
principle o f the contractarian system. However , communitarian systems wil l tr y to 
maximize economic efficiency through the maximization of social welfare because in a 
communitarian system maximizing aggregate social welfare through the economy is the 
primary goal (Bradley et al, 1989). Consequently , even i f U.S . corporat e governanc e 
practices are doing their best to improve economic efficiencies, these governance 
practices wil l no t be seen as improving economic efficiency when they are applied in 
communitarian economic systems. I n fact, what may appear to be a highly efficient 
mechanism of governance t o a U.S. corporatio n may appear entirely arbitrary and 
capricious to companies, investors, and government regulator s i n countries other than th e 
US. an d Great Britain (Licht , 2001). 
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3-4: Th e Flat Management Structure of Chrysle r 
In recen t year s some U.S . corporation s have tried to adopt more relational and long-term 
perspectives i n their governance systems . Thes e include long-term planning, flat 
management structure , qualit y circle type labor collaboration, and harmonizing labor and 
management relations . Thes e movements toward s a  more transparent system have been 
rather widely discussed (Bussman, 1998). 
Chrysler, for example, introduced a new flat organization structure i n the early 1990s . 
Chrysler changed its corporate structur e fro m a "chimney system" to a "platform system" 
in orde r to improve teamwork and collaboration in the workplace (Bussman, 1998). 
Platform structure an d flat management hav e generally been the norms in more 
communitarian societies such as Japan and Germany. I n the same way this kind of 
system facilitates information sharing and consensus buildin g among employees and 
management. 
The current method adapted fro m Japanese manufacturers an d since 
imitated by others, i s to assemble representative s fro m each of the key 
functions int o platform teams. [A platform is a basic chassis from which 
several vehicles may be made.] Team members fro m the differen t 
functions work simultaneously and communicate frequently t o assure, fo r 
instance, that the shape of a particular body part wil l accommodat e 
adjacent components . I n addition, a manufacturing representative ma y 
suggest that a minor change in the design of a  component wil l facilitat e 
more error-free assembly , or a supplier may suggest that a change wil l no t 
only increase the reliability o f a  component bu t also save cost. Under the 
old, chimney-styl e way of producing vehicles, most o f these suggestion s 
would have virtually no chance o f being adopted. Wit h platform teams, 
most o f them become reality. The result is a reduction of the time it takes 
to bring a new vehicle to market from about five  years to less than hal f 
that in many instances. Commensurat e saving s are achieved in costs, and 
defects averag e abou t one per vehicle currently (Bussman, 1998). 
In additio n to this transformation, Chrysle r also empowered its employees in the 
production processes s o that their suggestions coul d feed directly into Chrysler's design, 
manufacturing and marketing systems an d facilitate continuous quality improvement 
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practices throughout the entire Chrysler system (Bussman, 1998). A s a result, Chrysler 
was able to achieve not only higher quality in their products but also dramatic 
improvements in production processes an d labor relations. 
3-5: A General Description of Current influences on Japanese Corporat e 
Governance 
As the globalization o f Japanese markets has continued, the growth of international 
investors has also become more significant. Fo r the first time in Japanese history, 
Japanese boards and governance practices have included both overseas national s and 
foreign values. Thi s change is due to more than just cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions by Japanese corporations. I t is the result of participation in the Japanese 
equity markets, a phenomenon whic h has been increasing since 1990. Fo r example, the 
portion of foreign investor s in the total equity holdings of Japanese corporations was 
13.4% i n 1998 as compared to only 4% in 1990 (Ootsuka, 1999). Accordin g to the latest 
report by Kanda et al (2003), the portion of foreign investor s in Japanese equities was 
13.2% i n 2000. Table 1 is a list of the recent large investments i n Japanese markets by the 
foreign investor s (Ogawa, 2000). 
Table 1 : Large Investments i n Japan in Recent Years by Foreign-owned Corporations 
Month/Years Foreign 
Investor 
Japanese firm Type of investment 
Dec/1998 G M Isuzu Motors Additional investment of 14 
billion yen 
Jan/1999 GE Capita l Nippon Lease Bought out for 786.5 billio n 
yen 
Mar/1999 Renault Nissan Motor and 
Nissan Diesel Motor 
Capital participation of 605 
billion yen 
Sept/1999 BT and A T & T Nippon Telecom Capital participation of 220 
billion yen 
Sept/1999 Artemis Aoba Life Insuranc e Acquired for 15 billion yen 
Source: Ogawa (2000) 
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Since these new foreign shareholders hav e looked for higher short term returns from their 
investments tha n Japanese investors typically require, Japanese firms have had to 
consider the shareholder welfare for more seriously. This , in turn, has forced a number of 
changes i n their corporate governanc e practices . I n addition to general shareholde r 
welfare, Japanese corporations have been forced to focus on quarterly profits, higher 
dividends, capital gains, more timely disclosures, greater transparency, mor e efficient 
monitoring, and better communications in order to meet the requirements o f foreign 
equity investors (Ootsuka , 1999). 
When Japanese firms see the foreign institutional investors as 
shareholders, thei r influences to Japanese corporate governanc e an d 
management migh t not be so significant. However , it is quite importan t 
for the Japanese firms to notice meanings of strong demands fo r 
disclosures in the foreign institutional investors (Ootsuka, 1999) . 
Japanese firms would not be able to maintain stable shareholder s an d 
levels of stock prices i f they do not introduce 'efficient operations ' 
reflecting Western types of corporate governanc e that aim at maximization 
of shareholder returns (Ootsuka, 1999). 
The volume of equity trades in the Japanese market also shows a continuous progression 
in the globalization of the market. Since the end of the bubble economy in 1990, the 
major players in equity trades have been foreign investors (Ootsuka, 1999) . Whil e 
foreign investor s occupied only minor portions o f the overall traded value in the Nikke i 
in 1989 , this portion rose to 29.1% in 1997, a 20.3% increase. A s the portion of Japanese 
equities held by foreign investors increased, foreign investors also began to appear on and 
influence Japanese corporate board s (Ootsuka , 1999). 
The deregulation of equity trading and liberalizations of the Japanese equity markets hav e 
been also responsible for the current situations o f the Japanese markets (McKinse y & 
Company, Nov 10 2001). Suc h deregulations starte d i n 1990 to make the Japanese 
securities market more liquid through encouraging equity trades in the markets. Fo r 
example, Japanese government deregulate d bon d issues and stock listing criteria for 
Tokyo Stock Exchange from 199 0 to 1991 . I n addition to these deregulations, Japanese 
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government stare d improvin g transparencies o f the markets by introducing the mandator y 
disclosure to the large equity holders. Thes e governance action s became th e bases of the 
Japanese big bang in November 1996. Th e big bang is a comprehensive reorganization s 
and reformations o f the Japanese financial an d banking industries (Ootsuka, 1999). 
Japanese government ha s also built new legal environments to support th e big bang. Fo r 
example, Japanese government implemente d the new commercial acts to promote equity 
barter i n the markets (McKinse y & Company, Jan 1 s t 2002). Whil e such equity barter is 
expected initiall y to encourage merger s and acquisitions in the Japanese markets, active 
equity barters are also expected to improve both transparency o f the Japanese corporat e 
governance practice s and financial informatio n disclosures with the market enforcements . 
To let Japanese managers feel the market reactions and forces, the new commercial acts 
enhanced flexibilitie s of the sock options in the Japanese markets. Fundamentally , this 
aims at giving Japanese executives both senses of the market-driven senses such as ROI , 
capital gains, and the market reactions to their operations (McKinse y & Company, Jan 1 s t 
2002). Actually , Japanese executives who notice large capital gains from executions of 
the stock options have started makin g decisions and strategic plans to improve their stock 
performances an d returns from the equity holdings. 
These deregulations , the big bang, and the new commercial acts also changed th e 
traditional relationships between Japanese firms and the main banks by letting the 
securities market monitor corporate governance practices and corporate performance s o f 
the Japanese firms.  Sinc e the main banks had held their strong appearances not only by 
their financial  powers but also their monitoring and intervention functions, the traditional 
relationships would be more business orientation after th e securities markets took over 
the financing and the monitoring functions (Charkham, 1994; Fukao and Morita, 1994 ; 
Aoki, 2000; Gilson, 2001; McDonnell, 2002). 9 
Especially after Japanese government passed new ac t to limit amounts of shareholdings of commercial 
banks on November 2001, suc h relationships have been clearly changed (Mizuho Researc h Institute, 2002). 
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According to McDonnell (2002) , main bank i s defined as "the bank with which a 
Japanese firm has a special long-term relationship." Th e main banks maintain such long-
term relationships through loans to and equity holdings of Japanese corporations 
(McDonnell, 2002). Charkha m (1994) stated that the main bank system was the mos t 
convenient method fo r the Japanese companies to finance working capitals in where 
sufficient capital s were not available in the equity markets during the post-WWII 
economic redevelopment. Th e main bank system was also effective tool for the Japanese 
government t o allocate scarce financia l resources efficientl y to rebuild the Japanese 
economies (Aoki , 2000). 
One of the most important tools for the main banks to maintain the long-term business 
relationships is called as the selective intervention (Aoki, 2000). I t has been the most 
effective safeguar d i n Japanese companies because the Japanese corporations can expect 
operational and managerial supports fro m their main banks when the firms face financial 
and operational troubles (Kester, 1991; Lightfoot and Kester, 1991; Fukao, 1999). 
Generally speaking, the main banks take leading positions during the selective 
interventions due to their strong positions as critical financia l source s an d participants of 
governance practice s (Lightfoot and Kester, 1991). Wit h their financial powers and 
information resources , the main banks can suggest effective remedial actions and suppor t 
implementations o f the remedial actions during the selective interventions. Naturally , the 
main banks wil l monito r and supervise the corporate governanc e practice s to ensure 
timely approvals and implementations o f the remedial actions. 
While the main banks do the selective interventions to save their clients, the main banks 
will als o gain benefits fro m the successful selectiv e interventions. Thes e benefits hav e 
been explained as the economic motivation and the relational motivation (Fukao, 1999). 
From the economic standpoint, the banks take the selective interventions to protect thei r 
loans that generate cash inflows to the banks as interests. Consequently , the banks mus t 
make sure their clients are financially  an d operational healthy enough to pay the interest s 
to the banks and to maintain the capital principals (Fukao, 1999). 
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As I  mentioned, the economic relationships between Japanese firm s and the main banks 
have changed by the diffusions of the equity financings of Japanese corporation s and the 
liquidations of the Japanese equit y markets through deregulations and new commercial 
laws (Yoshimitsu, 1999) . Sinc e the main banks wil l do the selective interventions and 
monitoring only i f they loan sufficient capitals to companies, the main banks wil l no t 
keep the interventions and the monitoring i f corporations finance their working capitals in 
the securities markets. I n addition, the companies will not ask for the selective 
interventions and the monitoring to the main banks i f the Japanese securitie s markets are 
efficient enoug h to monitor and supervise their business operations and governance 
practices through stock prices and market reactions (Yoshimitsu, 1999). 
Such changing relationships between the main banks and the Japanese companie s have 
been clearly observed. Accordin g to MITI (2003), 86% of Japanese firms thought th e 
relationships with the main banks would change. Instea d of functional contribution s to 
the Japanese governance s and operations, the main banks have started acting as financia l 
service institutions that support Japanese corporations ' global business operations, global 
financings, and globa l investments. I n addition, Japanese firms try to use the former 
main banks as financial  consultant s that have accumulated experiences and sufficient 
industry information (Latham, 1999) . Fo r example, 32.7% of Japanese firms pointed out 
that the main banks were critical information resources for their operations (MITI , 2003). 
As I  described, deregulations, new commercial acts, diffusions of the equity financing, 
and changin g relationships with the main banks have changed the traditional Japanese 
governance practices. Mor e precisely, the Japanese governanc e practices have acquired 
more market-oriented values of governance. 
In additio n to the influences form the domestic markets, the globalizations of businesses 
and financing s of the Japanese companie s have changed the traditional Japanes e 
governance practices to more market-driven governance practices. Mainly , the 
globalizations of the Japanese governance practices aim at making Japanese firms more 
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attractive to the foreign investors (Latham, 1999). On e of the obvious changes o f the 
traditional Japanese governance practices is to allow the foreign investors to participate 
into the governance practices (Kanda, 1999 ; MITI, 2003). 
Under these new environments for the Japanese governance practices, the Federation of 
Economic Organization of Japan (Keidanren) encouraged Japanese companies acquiring 
necessity values and functions of corporate governance that the new environments ask for 
(Keidanren, 1997) . T o support the acquisitions, Keidanren issued the Urgent 
Recommendation Concerning Corporate Governance that is suggesting the Japanese 
firms to introduce global standards i n auditing, director responsibilities, functions of the 
board, shareholder protections, and disclosures. 
In order to maintain and strengthen their international competitiveness into 
the twenty-first century in the context of an ag e of mega-competition, 
Japanese businesses must realize a form of corporate governance that 
meets global standards. Corporation s are working on a regular basis to 
improve their management efficienc y an d to implement policies giving 
greater priority to stockholders interests, but in addition they are now 
expected to achieve corporate governance that is effective in firmly 
establishing corporate ethics and ensuring sound management. Thi s 
requires consideration of such matters as the proper shape of corporate 
organs, the way in which they exercise restraint on each other, and the 
arrangements fo r checks on management. (Keidanren , 1997). 
The corporat e governance committee of corporate governance forum of Japan issued the 
Japanese Revised Corporate Governance Principles as the guiding principles of the 
Japanese corporate governance practices in the global markets. Th e principles were built 
based upon global governance principles such as the OEC D principle (ECGI, 2003). 
These principles suggest more market-oriented governance practices to the Japanese 
companies even i f the principles stil l respect the communitarian values of governance. 
For example , while directors are responsible for monitoring, supervisions, and strategic 
decisions, the directors should still respect good relationships with the CEO during the 
directors' services (Principle 1  and 2-1). O n the other hand, the principles suggest hig h 
levels of the director independences by including the independent outside directors in the 
38 
boards (Principl e 3-2 and 4). Simila r to the other principles, the Japanese principles also 
suggest timely disclosures of corporate information , accurate financia l statement s and 
audits, and maintenances o f transparencies o f the governance practices (Principle 1 1 and 
12). 
3-6: A  General Description of Current Influences on German Corporat e 
Governance 
After the integration of West Germany and East Germany, German securities market s 
experienced stock trade booms that brought senses of shareholders welfare s into German 
investors in 1990s. Suc h investors increased German market capitalization significantly 
as well as equity values in the German markets. 
For example, total market capitalization in German equity market of 1999 increased by 
approximately 800% in compare to the capitalization of 1987 (Kumagai, 2002). I n 
addition, these significant increases i n the market capitalization had been accelerate d 
through a  series o f privatizations such as Deutsch Telecom. While domestic equity trades 
of 199 1 were only 17.8 billion D M , these trades rose to 107. 3 billion D M i n 1998. 
Similarly, foreign equity trades of 1998 became 199. 6 billion D M whil e the trades of 
1991 were only 24.6 billion D M . Especially , the foreign equity trades in the German 
equity markets occupie d approximately 65% of total equity trades in 1998 (Japan 
Ministry o f Finance, 2003). 
Such globalizations in the German equity markets have been supported by advanced 
global information networks that allow the foreign investors not only to access detail 
corporate and market information but also to make equity trades. Especially , such 
advanced global information networks facilitate the cross-border mergers an d 
acquisitions in the German equity markets (Kumagai , 2002). 
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Since the IT revolutions dramatically improved information and decision environments 
for equity investments i n the German securities market , German companies have had to 
develop more effective governance structure s i n order to allo w them to make more 
timely decisions and to implement more rapid changes i n order to respond to more 
efficient globa l information networks. 
While there are several obstacles i n the traditional German governance structure s t o make 
such timely actions with the advanced information technologies, the cross-capitalization 
with commercial banks and other business allie s has been one of the most seriou s 
obstacles. Th e cross-capitalization will make speeds of the decisions and 
implementations slo w because consensus buildin g and interest alignment s amon g 
participations of the cross-shareholdings tak e time. Eve n i f they have a final decision, 
implementation of the decision would take time because the implementation has to be 
progressed graduall y to ensure the consensus i n the implementation process (Kumagai, 
2002). 
To support the restructurings o f the traditional German governance structure s throug h the 
dissolutions of the cross-shareholdings, the German government eliminate d tax burden on 
capital gains from the dissolution of the reciprocal shareholdings in 2002 (Logue and 
Seward, 1999 ; Kumagai, 2002). Germa n corporations welcome the deregulations an d tax 
removals with great appreciations. Fo r example, when government announcemen t o f the 
tax elimination was released o n December 23 in 1999, German stock index increased by 
approximately 4% and recorded the highest point . Eventually , several large corporation s 
and commercial banks announced thei r liquidations of the cross-shareholdings (Kumagai, 
2002; Mizuho Research Institute, 2002 ; Ministry of Finance of Japan, 2003). A s a 
result, the tax eliminations increased levels of not only the German market capitalization 
and equity trades but also the effectiveness o f the German governance structure s 
significantly (Logue and Seward, 1999; Kumagai, 2002). 
German companies have also tried to reform their traditional German corporat e 
governance systems . Fo r example, GPC Biotec h A G ha s created guidin g governance 
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principles for better performances o f their governance practices . Th e principles are built 
based on the Code of Best Practice of the German Panel on Corporate Governance which 
is actually already following OEC D governance principle s (GPC, 2002). 
Fundamentally, both the GPC principles and the Code of Best Practice aim at appropriat e 
protections o f shareholder right s (GPC, 2002; www.rid.ru, 2003). Fo r example, the 
responsibilities and duties o f the management boar d and the supervisory board have been 
redefined based on shareholder value . Th e management boar d has been given the 
responsibility for efficient operational management an d managerial decisions in order to 
maximize corporate value s and profitability. Th e supervisory board has been structure d 
both to maintain a high degree of independence fro m management (i n order to obtain 
better monitoring and control), to protect shareholde r welfare and to contribute to 
increase corporate values and shareholder welfare . 
This statement of principles also recommends timel y and efficient disclosure as well a s 
timely communication and information exchange among the various corporat e 
constituencies i n order to improve the corporation's overal l governance. T o satisfy these 
recommendations, th e GP C principles recommend that the management boar d establish 
and maintain effective informatio n flows and communication between the managemen t 
board and the supervisory board (GPC, 2002; www.rid.ru, 2003). 
3-7: Recen t Changes in the Japanese and German Corporate Governanc e Systems 
As previously described, as a result of globalization, the previously traditional Japanese 
and German corporate governanc e system s have been moving towards a  more market -
driven orientation. I n generally, the Anglo-American corporate governanc e syste m has 
been characterized as having five indigenous governance values . Thes e are (Charkham, 
1994; Monks and Minow, 2000; Sheard, 2003): 
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1. Marke t orientation 
2. Contractua l structure 
3. Boar d of directors independenc e 
4. Shareholde r wealth maximization 
5. A  short-term financia l an d strategic perspective (Charkham , 1994; Monks and Minow , 
2000; Sheard, 2003). 
In contrast, Japanese and German corporate governanc e have been characterized and 
described by five different indigenou s values of the communitarian system. Thes e fiv e 
values are (Charkham, 1994; Monks and Minow, 2000; Sheard, 2003): 
1. A n insider orientation 
2. Relationa l management and financing 
3. Assure d participation in major decision-making by all stakeholders 
4. A  total welfare orientation 
5. A  long-term perspective 
Insider orientation typically reflects a  policy of internal promotions, placing employee 
representatives on the board/boards o f directors, employee-oriented corporate governanc e 
practices, and corporate-group oriente d financial an d strategic practices such as those 
practiced by the Japanese Keiretsu in their special relationships with their lead banks. 
Basically, an insider oriented corporate governanc e syste m aims to protect all 
stakeholders i n the organization (Lightfoot and Kester, 1991; Charkham, 1994; Monks 
and Minow, 2000). 
In German corporate governance , the supervisory board consists of the representatives 
from major shareholders , labo r union, and employees to protect these stakeholders ' 
interests. However , the supervisory board has had social obligations to bring benefits t o 
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their communities. Th e management boar d is organized by professional management to 
ensure good business decision s and operational performances (Charkham , 1994). 10 
Based on the current survey and reports, the insider-orientation has been stil l preferred by 
German and Japanese firms.  Fo r example, according to a field  research i n Japan, only 
25% o f 690 large Japanese corporations have tried to change inside r directorships and 
internal promotion systems. Thi s indicates that Japanese firms have stil l strongly 
maintained insider oriented corporate governanc e wit h powerful inside directors and 
executives (The Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . As another 
example, MITI's report (2003 ) discussed that Japanese firms would maintain the insider 
orientation under strong pressures towards mor e market (outsider) orientation . 
According to MITI (2003) , this is not a rejection to the outsider orientation because the 
Japanese companies have introduced outside directorships actively. Mainly , Japanese 
firms have used the outside directors as symbols of better disclosures in global markets . 
Basically, Japanese firms have stil l thought that insiders perform better supervisions and 
decision-makings due to more knowledge and experiences i n their businesses . 
German insider orientation in corporate governance has created an d strengthened i n 
German histories and cultural values. Consequently , the insider orientation with such 
dependences will no t be completely and easily eliminated under the curren t 
globalizations and pressures from the international investors (Suzuki, 1999) . I n addition, 
such inside oriented governance syste m wil l be stil l maintained since the German 
corporate la w has mandated th e employee-oriented compositions of the two-tier board 
structures (GPC , 2002) . 
The purpose o f Corporate Governance is to achieve a responsible, value-
oriented management an d control of companies . Corporat e Governance 
Rules promote an d reinforce the confidence of current and futur e 
1 0 See , the Co-determination Act of May 1976 . Charkham (1994). Pp.14, 17-18, 22-24. For the protection 
of shareholder's rights, see the German Stock Corporation Ac t or Aktiengeseta AktG: Section 12 for full 
voting right for each ordinary share, Section 67 for no impediments with regard to ownership or 
registration, Section 68 for transferability of share at ay time, Section 134 for participation, proxy and 
exercise of voting rights at general meeting, Section 101 for election of members of the supervisory board, 
and Section 58 for participation in company profits. Fo r more detail, see GPC Biotec h AG (No v 2001). 
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shareholders, lenders , employees, business partners and the general public 
in national and international markets (GPC , 2002). 
Generally speaking, both Japanese and German governance structure s hav e tried to 
acquire the market orientations. Especially , active equity trades and the cross-borde r 
mergers an d acquisitions in their equity markets have forced the indigenous structures t o 
obtain the market-oriented governanc e values . I n addition, domestic investors have been 
familiar wit h concepts o f the shareholder welfar e protections. A s a result, Japanese and 
German governance structure s hav e to obtain a series o f the market-oriented value s such 
as the shareholde r protections , market-based decisions , and stock price consciousness . 
In Japan, the market-orientation value s that the traditional Japanese structure should 
obtain have been characterized with better disclosure, active external financing, better 
investor relations, stock performances, an d the stock options. Especially , the disclosure 
has been quite important issue for the Japanese corporate governanc e sinc e the main 
banks have not been able to monitor and supervise Japanese corporate performance s an d 
governance practices due to drastic shifts to the equity financings (Kester, 1991; 
Milhaupt, 1996) . Consequently , Japanese companies have had to rely strongly on market 
reactions, evaluations, and stock performances fo r the monitoring and supervision (The 
Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . 
In addition, better disclosures and governance transparency hav e been critica l issues fo r 
Japanese companies that have tried to raise working capitals in the foreign equity market s 
(The Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . Fo r example, several 
Japanese companies have started trying to improve qualities of their disclosures to reduce 
costs of capital in the global equity markets by eliminating the Japan premium (Fukao, 
1999). 
Japanese corporations have tried to improve the market and operational performances b y 
improving decision-making processes an d qualities of directors. Fo r example, 80.9% of 
large 690 Japanese firms have tried to accelerate spee d of decision-makings through 
downsizing of the board. I n addition, 65.7% of the Japanese firms have tried to chang e 
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performance measurement s from sales volumes to profits such as net profit or gross profi t 
(The Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . 
In Germany, the stock booms of 1990s introduced the market orientation in the German 
equity markets. A s I described already, these booms made the size of the German equity 
market eight times as large as it used to be. Durin g the booming, German investors hav e 
been getting familiar with ideas of the shareholder value maximization. This market 
orientation has been expected to be accelerated afte r th e German government eliminated 
taxes on capital gains from dissolving the reciprocal shareholdings (Kumagai , 2002; 
Japan Ministr y of Finance, 2003). 
Relational aspects and long-term orientation have been considered as explici t 
characteristics o f the communitarian governance practices . I t is well known that 
Japanese corporate governanc e practices are characterized by long-term relationships and 
mutual trusts (Sheard, 2003). Lightfoo t and Kester (1991) described these relational 
values in the Japanese automobile industries. 
In the automobile industry, for example, a business relationship between 
two companies wil l formally begin with the signing of a 'basic 
agreement,' usually a long-term contract subjec t t o annual renewal. 
Rather than addressing a specific transaction, basic agreements are 
expressions o f intent to engage in mutually beneficial business 
transactions, t o establish and maintain an atmosphere o f mutual trust in 
business dealings , and to respect eac h other's autonomy Basi c 
agreements receive much of senior management's time, for considerable 
due diligence is done before enterin g into a close, long-term relationship 
(Lightfoot and Kester, 1991). 
In Germany, the relational values can be expressed by the three core functions o f the 
supervisory board: interlocking function, monitoring function, and strategic decision 
making and ratification function (Charkham, 1994). Th e interlocking function of the 
supervisory board is to establish efficient interaction flows based upon mutual trusts and 
interdependence i n corporations to make good business decisions and executions 
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(Charkham, 1994) . The German corporate acts still suppor t the core functions o f the 
supervisory board. 
While the relational values are stil l supported by the German laws and the two-tier board 
structures, i t is important to see how the business relationships between commercial 
banks and German corporations have changed. Germa n commercial banks have taken 
powerful positions in German industry as suppliers of working capitals and busines s 
information. Th e origin of such special relationship between the banks and German 
corporations can be found in the early stages of German industrialization. A t the time, 
the German corporations had nothing but the banks for their financial resources because 
domestic capital markets wer e seriously underdeveloped and capitals in the markets wer e 
not sufficient enough to support the corporate financin g (Lightfoot and Kester, 1991; 
Charkham, 1994). 11 Germa n corporations have received comprehensive and wide 
ranging services such as depository services, loans, investment advice, free foreign 
exchange transactions, fre e consulting , advising, extensive monitoring, and information 
resources (Charkham , 1994). 
According to the current empirica l studies, Japanese and German firms have stil l 
maintained the relational values. Fo r example, majority of the 690 large Japanese 
corporations considered the long-term relationships with stable shareholders woul d be 
still very valuable and appropriate (Th e Corporate management an d H RM special 
committee, 1997) . Tabl e 2 shows this tendency (Shimotani , 2003). 
1 1 Th e German capital markets have been still inefficient in compare to the Anglo-American o r Anglo-
Saxon capital markets because German corporations have been financing from the banks. A s a result, 
German industry's market capitalization has been still low i n compare to other Western counterparts. A t 
the same time, debt financing has been quite high level in compare to the counterparts. Th e German 
corporations have called these banks as Universalbanken  referring t o banks that offer comprehensive and 
wide range of services such as deposit, lending, investment, foreign exchange, consulting, advising, 
monitoring, and information resources. 
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Table 2: Stockholders Structure (% ) 
Year Banks Corporations Individuals Foreign Investor s 
1985 21.6 24.1 25.2 5.7 
1990 16.4 25.2 23.1 4.2 
1995 15.4 23.6 23.6 9.4 
1996 15.1 23.8 23.6 9.8 
1997 14.6 24.1 24.6 9.8 
1998 14.0 24.1 25.4 10.0 
1999 12.8 23.7 26.4 12.4 
2000 11.5 22.3 26.3 13.2 
Source: Shimotani, (2003) 
However, even i f Japanese companies have tried to maintain long-term business 
relationships with the main banks, the relationships have been stil l changed fro m long -
term financial  relationship s to long-term business partnerships. Th e business partnershi p 
uses the main banks as advisors and consultants fo r their business operation s (Mizuh o 
Research Institute, 2002) . 
This concept of the new long-term relationship with the main bank has been also applied 
to the relationships with keiretsu members an d other business alliance s as the 
relationship-based alliances and collaborations (MITI, 2003). Th e relationship-based 
alliances and collaborations are long-term relationships based upon not the cross-
shareholdings bu t the pure business collaborations . Th e shift to the new relationship has 
been observed with the dissolutions of the cross-shareholdings. Fo r example, 43.8% of 
690 Japanese companies thought that inefficient cross shareholdings must be liquidated 
(The Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . 
In the German governance system , the relational aspects will be maintained by the two-
tier board structures require d by the law. Th e two-tier systems respec t long-ter m stable 
relationships with stakeholders suc h as employees, unions, and banks (Suzuki , 1999 ; 
GPC, 2002; Mizuho Research Institute, 2002) . 
However, even i f the traditional long-term relationships would be kept, German firms 
have changed the natures of the long-term business relationships . Fo r example, German 
cross shareholdings have been dissolved greatly because they have started emphasizing 
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on asset s efficiency an d returns fro m equitie s that have held through the maintaining 
cross shareholdings while German firms will stil l maintain the cross shareholdings for 
business relationships (Kumagai, 2002). 
Naturally, these actions have influenced traditional relationships with commercial banks 
because th e banks were the largest players of the cross-shareholdings. Sinc e the German 
companies have changed attitudes t o the cross-shareholdings, the banks have also started 
changing their attitudes. Fo r example, the banks have started acting as pure equity 
investors in the German corporations who expect for higher returns fro m thei r 
investments (Kanamor i et al , 1993 ; Federal Ministry o f Justice, 2003). 
Similar to the German firms, the commercial banks have started dissolvin g the cross-
shareholdings for better asset utilizations and returns fro m their investments. Fo r 
example, in 2000, D.B. Investor 12 stated , "A t th e latest, by the year 2007, we wil l 
liquidate all equities of more than 20 large German firms including Daimler-Chrysler in 
markets." (Kumagai, 2002). Accordin g to Kumagai (2002), the Deutsch Bank planed to 
use capital gains from the liquidations to invest in their core businesses an d non-listing 
high-tech firms for better returns. 
Participation and stakeholder wealth orientation have been considered as important 
characteristics o f the communitarian governances. Mostly , participations are observed in 
cross business activitie s and monitoring because these activities are collaborative among 
business allies . Suc h participations are also described as the selective interventions, 
cross-directorships, employee transfers, an d director transfers. 
In Japanes e industries, when several firms hold shares each other, total returns fro m th e 
investments tend to be greater due to overall business growth and expansions through 
collaborative and coordinated business activities . I n addition, the reciprocal ownerships 
allow each Japanese company to conduct businesses a t lower level of asset ownership 
1 2 Thi s company has managed equities held by the Deutsch Bank. 
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since assets are held by other firms where the company holds their equities as the cros s 
shareholdings (Kester , 1991). 
Once Japanese companies establish such business relationships, active information 
sharing through both formal and informal communications begins among the members . 
Such information sharing can be even extended to the management transfer s o r the cros s 
directorship to create group-wide information networks and business interaction s (Kester, 
1991; Lightfoo t and Kester, 1991). 
The German laws have mandated participation s and collaborations of all stakeholders . 
For example , the German stock corporation act defined the two-tired board system as a 
basic structure o f the German corporate governance (Monk s and Minow, 2000). Thi s 
system facilitates stakeholder participation in operational decisions and in governance 
practices since the supervisory board consists o f representatives fro m unions, employees, 
and shareholders . 
In additio n to the two-tier structure, the co-determination act of May 197 6 has stil l asked 
management t o make business decision s to ensure both corporate welfare s and 
stakeholder welfares (Charkham, 1994). Especially , this act facilitates German 
companies aiming at the total welfare maximizations because of the stakeholde r 
participations into the business decision s and operations a t the board levels. 
According the current empirica l studies, while the fundamental mechanism s to suppor t 
the participations have been highly destabilized in the current globalizations , Japanese 
firms have stil l respected th e basic values of participations and collaborations. Namely, 
while Japanese companies have considered shareholders a s important stakeholders , the y 
have stil l considered their employees as more important stakeholders tha n th e 
shareholders (Th e Corporate management an d H RM special committee, 1997 ; Hirata, 
2003). 
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The executive officer syste m in Japanese corporate governance s ha s been a good example 
to see how Japanese companies have tried to acquire the market-driven values while they 
still keep the basic Japanese governance values . Th e executive officer syste m or Shikko 
Yakuin Seido has been a dominant governance system in large Japanese companies sinc e 
Sony's first introduction of the system in 1997. 13 Th e executive officer syste m was made 
based upon the officer syste m of the U.S . corporate governanc e system . Consequently , 
this system is neither the Japanese traditional corporate governanc e syste m nor a 
governance syste m under the Japanese commercial law (Sony, 1997; Ueda, 1999) . 
Japanese corporations have introduced the executive officer syste m to gain effectivenes s 
of the U.S . governance practices even i f they maintain the long-term relationships and 
collaborations among the insiders (Ueda, 1999). Accordin g to Ueda (1999), 87.3% of 
100 large and leading Japanese corporations had already introduced the executive office r 
system in order to shorten the corporate decision-makin g process. 65.1 % of the 
companies answered that the introduction of the system was also intended to revitalize 
corporate board meetings. Othe r reasons reported fo r adopting an executive office r 
system were to (1) reduce the number of directors, (2) to strengthen the monitoring of 
board functions, and (3) to allow directors to focus on a higher level of decision-making. 
According to the Sony's executive officer system , the board of Sony headquarters 
includes seven inside directors, two outside directors, and four auditors. The two outside 
directors satisfy SEC' s requirements fo r securities market listings (Sony, 1997; Ueda, 
1999). Whil e the outside directors have been getting more importance in the board, 
their contributions to the governance practices are quite limited since they cannot b e 
members o f the management committees where are actual places for final  decisions and 
supervisions. Instea d o f the two outside directors, all seven inside directors can attend 
both the board meetings an d the management committees sinc e they are also executive 
officers. Consequently , the board independence migh t not be assured quit e well (Ueda, 
1999). 
1 3 I n 1997 , Son y introduced the executive officer system that was approve d at the 80 th regular shareholder 
meeting. 
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Generally speaking, there are many arguments sayin g that the executive officer syste m 
might not improve the Japanese governance practices . Fo r example, Japanese companies 
have introduced the system not for the improvements of the governance performances bu t 
for th e symbols of corporate effort s t o improve the governance performances (Ueda , 
1999). Accordin g to Ueda (1999), the executive officer syste m would be only the 
symbolic actions to impress the equity markets temporarily by showing the corporat e 
efforts t o satisfy severa l market requests such as better disclosures or fast decision-
makings. Rather , the actual benefits fro m the executive officer syste m are restructuring s 
of the boards by reducing the sizes of the boards. Fo r example, Sony reduced 25 
directors and Toshiba reduced approximately 20 directors after thei r introductions of the 
system (Ueda, 1999). 
The German corporations wil l stil l respect th e participations and the collaborations 
because of the two-tier board structure an d other laws that ensure the stakeholders ' 
participations into corporate governance practices . Eve n i f the current situation s are not 
quite appropriate fo r the participations, the German companies wil l stil l maintain the 
values o f the participations as long as the German laws mandate the two-tier structure an d 
the co-determination principle (Jackson, 2002). 
However, as I  described, it is true that the German firms have tried to change th e 
traditional governance structure s t o be more market-oriented structure s afte r th e removals 
of the taxation on capital gains from dissolutions of the cross shareholdings on January 
1st, 200 2 (Kumagai, 2002). Thes e have changed the values of the participations greatly 
because the participations and the collaborations have been based upon tightly connected 
long-term business relationship s through the cross-shareholdings (Mizuh o Research 
Institute, 2002) . 
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4: Discussion of the Globalization o f Indigenous Corporate Governance Systems 
4-1: Theoretical Discussio n of the Processes of Globalization an d their Action upon 
Indigenous Corporate Governance Systems 
While there are discussions about changed in various governance structures i n the current 
global markets, there have been discussions about the globalizations of the indigenous 
governance structures before the current globalizations. Accordin g to Hirata (2003), 
there are two common ways of the globalizations of the indigenous governance structure s 
and practices. Th e first way is to modify the indigenous governance systems to satisfy 
the new values and goals emerging from the globalizations. Whil e such modifications 
could satisfy these new environments temporarily, the modifications would not be the 
best solutions because the modified indigenous governance structures woul d loose their 
temporary effectiveness i n the new environments when the new global environments 
demand for new values that exceed the fundamental capacities of the indigenous 
structures. 
Esser (2001) pointed out two required conditions of the modified governance models. 
These two points also imply the limitations of performances o f the modified indigenous 
governance structures i n the new environments. First , the modifications must build 
appropriate functions and structures i n the indigenous structures s o that the modified 
structures could be effective in the complicated global markets where various regulations, 
business patterns, customers , employees, and shareholders exist. 
Second, the modifications must give the universal governance elements to the indigenous 
structures. Fo r example, the modified structures must be universal enough to allow the 
various investors in the global markets to have satisfactions form the governance 
practices (Esser, 2001). Thes e two points have been also supported by Monks and 
Minow (2000) as the global citizenship responsibilities of MNEs in the global markets. 
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While Esser (2001) did not state the universal elements o f the modified structures, Monk s 
and Minow (2000) stated six universal requirements t o increase the international 
investors' confidence level s that the modified indigenous structures shoul d satisfy. Firs t 
of all , the modifications should give the international investors several tools to monitor 
and supervise entire governance procedures an d practices to protect thei r interests . 
Second, the modified structures shoul d allow the international investors to send their 
representatives t o the board of directors to monitor the governance practices and 
decisions. Third, the modifications should encourage th e managers ensuring high levels 
of accuracies and honesties o f the financia l informatio n through stric t auditing 
mechanisms. Fourth , the modifications should establish efficient voting systems fo r the 
international investors so that they could appeal their opinions and requests through th e 
votes. Fifth , th e modifications should build various disclosure mechanisms to improve 
the disclosures. Basically , the managers in the modified structures mus t disclose critical 
events and information timely to all investors. Finally , the investors should be able to use 
their ownership transfer right s in the modified structures . 
The second way of the modifications is to replace their indigenous governance structure s 
with new and more effective governanc e structures . Thi s approach is not easy in 
compare to the firs t one because there would be conflicts in organizations dues to both 
traditional and cultural differences betwee n the indigenous structures an d the new 
structures (Hirata , 2003). However , this approach might build truly effective governanc e 
systems wit h long-term stability if the replacements ar e done appropriately by 
considering the various differences i n the governance values . 
While these two ways have been generally supported i n the globalizations of the 
indigenous governance structures , MNE s have preferred th e modifications of their 
traditional governance system s to the replacements wit h the new systems based upon my 
previous arguments abou t the general tendencies o f the globalizations of MNEs ' 
indigenous corporate governanc e systems . Emergence s o f the hybrid structures o f 
various indigenous governances ar e good examples of such preferences an d general 
trends of the globalizations of the MNEs ' corporat e governanc e structures . 
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From the theoretical points of view, there are two theoretical concepts underneath th e 
discussions of the two typical ways of the governance globalizations. Th e two theoretical 
concepts are the convergences of the governance structures and the non-convergences of 
the structures due the path dependences o f various indigenous governance values. 
4-2: Convergenc e Arguments 
The convergence arguments have been quite popular for the explanations the futur e 
directions of the transformations o f indigenous governance structures (Hirata , 2003). 
Since the convergence concepts were originally developed based upon the U.S. industrial 
developments and dominances (Guillen, 2000), the convergence arguments assume that 
all corporations in the world would adopt the U.S. corporate governance structures as the 
best governance model as their industrializations progress. Thes e convergence 
assumptions were highly supported in 1960s because scholars believed that the strong 
U.S. dominances in the world economies were achieved by higher effectiveness o f the 
U.S. governance structures and practices than any other indigenous governance 
structures. 
Based upon the assumptions, the convergence arguments have predicted future directions 
of system developments (Bratton and McCahery, 1999) . Fo r example, in the global 
products markets, proponents o f the convergences argued that there were homogeneous 
elements and structures making the absolute superiorities of corporations. Th e 
homogeneous elements include not only he structural differences but also environmental 
elements such as type of regulations, laws, and economic policies as Rowley and Benson 
(2002) stated. 
Early convergence theorists, such as Harbison and Myers and Kerr et al., 
assumed that the process of industrialization and the spread of advanced 
technology would move all countries towards political and economic 
systems similar to that of the United States. .. . there is 'one best way' of 
managing (Rowley and Benson, 2002). 
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While the convergence concepts have the conceptual backgrounds as the assumptions, the 
convergence has been classified int o two different types based upon the ways of 
convergence. On e of the types is called as the formal convergence while the other is 
called as the functional convergence (McDonnell , 2002). 
Nothing else in the literature is quite so sweeping as Hangman and 
Karaka, but a number of other scholars seem to accept the basic point. 
John Coffee and Ronald Gilson distinguish formal and functional 
convergence (McDonnell , 2002). 
The formal convergence is a transformation of a certain indigenous structure to be a 
different indigenou s structure a s figure 1 shows . 
Figure 1 : Formal Convergence 
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The formal convergence refers a complete convergence to a system that is absolutely 
superior to the other systems. Especially , when the convergence concepts emerged, the 
formal convergence refers complet e transformations o f indigenous political and 
economic systems to the U.S . systems (Harbison and Myers, 1959 ; Kerr et al, 1960 ; 
Guillen, 2000). Thi s idea was used to explain some globalizations of various indigenous 
governance structures. Fo r example, Hangman and Karaka attributed the formal 
convergence to the absolute effectiveness o f the U.S. governance structure and its 
environments (McDonnell, 2002). 
However, for the broadest an d boldest statement of the view that currently 
dominates American legal academia, one should peruse The End of 
History for Corporate Law by Henry Hangman and Reinier Karaka. 
Hangman and Karaka believe they have spotted a growing consensus in 
academia, business and government in favor of a shareholder and market-
oriented model of corporate governance along American lines. ... Capita l 
markets and institutional investors prefer the American model and are 
helping to export it elsewhere because i t has proved its superiority in 
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practice. Thus , they think the world is converging to the American way, 
and that is a good thing (McDonnell, 2002). 
As I  mentioned, the formal convergence was generally and widely supported in the 
1960s. However , i t was severely criticized later for the oversimplified vie w of 
indoctrination processes and the overemphasis on the technological impacts (Rowley and 
Benson, 2002). I n addition to these theoretical inferiorities, there are two more reasons 
for the severe criticisms. First , there has been virtually no clear observation of the forma l 
convergences (Gilson, 2001). Th e lacking of the observations has been considered as 
serious deficiency of supports to the formal convergence concept (McDonnell, 2002). 
They [Hangman and Karaka] consider various alternative models and find 
them wanting - base d on very little evidence, it must be said. The y also 
point to some limited evidence of movement towards the American model 
in Europe and Japan as proof of their thesis (McDonnell , 2002). 
Second, it would be almost impossible to see a certain governance structure i n the same 
complementarities because there aren't the complete integrations of the various 
indigenous governance structures and the different complementarities such as laws and 
institutions for the indigenous governance practices. I n addition, such complete 
integrations are not expected at all because persistence o f the indigenous values would 
prevent the integration with their path dependences o f the indigenous values (Heinrich, 
1999; Khanna et al, 2001). 
Guillen (2000) proved the impossibility of the formal convergence and stated that 
differences i n legal, institutional, and political structures and systems were strong enough 
to prevent the formal convergence to a certain structure in the globalizations of 
indigenous governance systems. Rather , the globalizations are offering chance s to the 
indigenous governance structures to be more effective through acquisitions and 
adaptations o f various indigenous values that the current global markets request . 
The three arguments agains t convergence in corporate governance - legal , 
institutional, political - provid e enough reason to cast serious doubt on the 
idea that there is convergence in corporate governance, whether on the 
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shareholder-centered mode l or a hybrid. Globalizatio n seems to 
encourage countries and firms to be different, to look for a distinctive way 
to make a dent in international competition rather than to converge on a 
best model. I n a global context, corporate governance must support what 
a country and its firms can do best in the global economy. Globalizatio n 
seems not to be about convergence to best practice, but rather abou t 
leveraging difference in an increasingly borderless world (Guillen , 2000). 
The functional convergence refers modifications of their own governance structure s 
through adaptations o f different governance functions of various governance systems 
(Khanna et al, 2001). A  main difference between the formal convergence and the 
functional convergenc e is directions of the convergence processes. A s figure 2 shows, 
the functional convergence is a convergence to a new indigenous model based on the 
original indigenous model. I n other words, the original model transform to a new 
indigenous model by modifying itsel f with new values and functions of other governance 
structures. Consequently , the functional convergences have been considered as 
contingent movements or modifications of indigenous governance structures (Gilson , 
2001). 
Figure 2: Functional Convergence 
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Generally speaking, the functional convergence tends to be short-term lived since an 
output of functional convergenc e is only a modified syste m that still has weak 
competitive fitness and efficiency (Bratto n and McCahery, 1999 ; Gilson, 2001). 
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While the functional convergence has been clearly observed as the first step of reactions 
to the market globalizations, there are confusions between the functional convergence 
and the hybridizations even i f the hybridizations do not mean the modifications of the 
indigenous structures but the introductions of new governance structures tha t hold all 
required values of governance practices (Gilson, 2001). 
This misunderstanding emerged when Japanese companie s started introducing the 
executive officer syste m (Hirata, 2003). Th e executive officer syste m is not a hybrid 
structure but a modified traditiona l Japanese structur e because the executive office r 
system is simple adaptations of the market-driven governance structures to the traditional 
Japanese structures . Consequently , the executive officer syste m has not been the truly 
effective structur e that reflects optimum balances of the market-driven values and the 
relational values (Ueda, 1999). 
4-3: Non-convergence Arguments and Path Dependence 
The convergence arguments have been criticized for the over simplifications of 
globalizations of various indigenous systems (Rowley and Benson, 2002). I n addition to 
the criticisms, opponents of the convergence arguments have even created the non-
convergence discussions based upon the path dependences o f institutions, traditions, 
historical events, and cultures in indigenous corporate governance systems and practices 
(Guillen, 2000). 
There are at least three arguments i n the extant literature that provide a 
rationale against the prediction that corporate governance practices are 
converging or will converge across countries. First , corporate governance 
systems are tightly coupled with path-dependent regulator y traditions in 
the areas of banking, labor, tax and competition law that are unlikely to be 
modified i n the near future. (Guillen , 2000). 
The path dependence i s defined as "the tendency of corporate governance systems to 
preserve conditions that existed in the past due to economic or political reasons or simply 
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due to historical accident" (Licht, 2001). Suc h historical accident includes both initial 
conditions and historical events (Liebowit z and Margolis, 2002; Yoda, 2003). 
The pat h dependence theor y states that specific structures wil l no t converge toward a 
certain single structure because a  series of various historical events loc k in values 
generated i n the historical events as the bases of the structures (Arthur , 198 9 and 1990). 
Since the dependences fixe d indigenous governance values so tightly, it is impossible to 
break the strong persistence o f the historical dependences. Consequently , the historical 
dependences wil l protect the original values from invasions of new value s continuously 
(www.rikkyo.ne.jp, 2003). 
Since the path dependence i s generated fro m the historical events, the dependence is 
highly sensitive to the initia l conditions where every historical event begun (Liebowitz 
and Margolis , 2002).14 Consequently , the historical path dependences reflec t the initia l 
conditions because the historical events also reflect the initial conditions. 
According to the path dependence perspective , initial historical conditions 
matter in determining the corporate governance structures that are 
prevalent today. Centra l to the idea of path dependence ar e 
complementarities, also called indivisibilitie s (Khanna et al , 2001). 
The historica l path dependences ca n be observed and explained based upon the initia l 
conditions and a series of the historical events as core influences for the formations of th e 
dependences. However , the historical path dependences canno t be predicted prior to the 
events due to our knowledge limitations and information inefficiency (Gilson , 2001). 
This nature o f the historical path dependences ha s been characterized as the multiple 
optima and the unpredictability of outputs throughout the entire histories called as the 
stochastic process (Arthur, 1990) . Thi s unpredictability of the historical dependence s 
makes the transformations of various indigenous governance structures mor e complex 
1 Liebowit z an d Margolis discussed that the path dependence is observed even in markets characterized 
through utility maximization and voluntary decisions by an individual because the path dependence is 
highly sensitive to the initia l conditions. 
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because w e cannot predict future historica l influences to the indigenous governance 
structures during the transformations (Modis , 1989 ; Liebowitz and Margolis, 2002). 
While the historical events create strong historical persistence of the indigenous 
governance values, Licht (2001) discussed that the historical persistence i s not the only 
path dependences o f the indigenous governance values. I n addition the historical 
persistence, Licht (2001) pointed out the cultural dependences o f the indigenous values.15 
According to his arguments, the cultural values would be the strongest impac t on the 
persistence of the indigenous values that even created "a chain of causality" of a nation's 
political system. Thi s means that a nation's complementarities of the corporate 
governance would be significantly influenced in a series of the historical events by the 
cultural values that are locked in the indigenous governance structures. This argument 
has been supported especially by the institutional investors such as CalPERS that has 
suggested their own cultural value sensitive principles of corporate governance for 
corporations that CalPERS invests (Licht, 2001). 
Licht (2001) used the cultural dependences t o reject the formal convergence towards a 
single model in international corporate governance. 
Adopting features o f the German corporate governance system would be 
much smoother than adopting the American system if Greeks shared more 
cultural values with Germans. I f some American features stil l loo k 
attractive, more effort and resources would need to be invested in order to 
implement them in Greece. I n the extreme, a corporate law reform that 
ignores cultural differences can fail miserably , as the recent Russian 
experience proves (Licht, 2001). 
While there are three sources of the strong persistence o f governance values, the cultural 
values have been considered as the most powerful influences than the initia l conditions 
and the historical events. Thi s is because the cultural values are built in the historical 
processes and shared by members in a certain region. Therefore , the cultural values have 
Licht explained value as "constructs, commonplace in every society. The y reflect each society's 
preferences and priorities as to fundamental issues such as interactions between its individual members and 
the interrelations between society and the rest of the world." 
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stronger influences than the historical events and the initia l conditions that could be 
shared and interpreted differently in the region. T o express the strong influences of the 
cultural values, Licht (2001) called the cultural values as "the mother of all path 
dependencies." 
A nation' s culture can be perceived as the mother of all path 
dependencies. Figuratively , it means that a nation's culture might be more 
persistent than other factors believed to induce path dependence (Licht , 
2001). 
To make the path dependence argument s more specified in the fields o f corporate 
governance, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) described two sources of the path dependences in 
corporate governance systems: the structure driven dependences an d the rule driven 
dependences. Accordin g to their arguments, structures include both corporate structur e 
and ownership structure that are highly depending on the initia l economic and ownership 
structures. Consequently , since these structures are fundamentals o f the indigenous 
governance structures, they stated that all indigenous governance structures ar e differen t 
because the current corporate and ownership structures are locked in by various initial 
conditions. 
Rules mean the corporate rules that influence and define the ownership structure of 
corporations. Sinc e the ownership structure depends o n the initia l ownership conditions 
in the beginning of their economies, the corporate rules also reflect these initial 
conditions (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) . A s a result, corporate governance systems, which 
are highly controlled by the rules, also reflect such initial conditions (Bebchuk and Roe, 
1999; Heinrich, 1999) . 
These arguments o f the two sources of path dependences o f corporate governance 
systems weaken the formal convergence arguments because both the structures an d the 
rules are not changed and integrated to form a single mode without changing historical 
events that we cannot change anyway (Heinrich, 1999 ; Khanna et al, 2001). A t the end 
of their discussions, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) pointed out that the strong persistence of 
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the two sources prevented the formal convergence of the indigenous corporate 
governance structures . 
Our analysis shed a light on why the advanced economies differ i n their 
patterns of corporate ownershi p and governance. I t can explain why, 
notwithstanding the powerful forces of globalization and efficiency, som e 
key differences have thus far persisted. I t can also provide a basis for 
predicting that important differences night persist in the future. Pat h 
dependence i s an important force - on e that students of comparative 
corporate governance and ownership around the world (Bebchuk and Roe, 
1999). 
I have discussed the fact that the path dependent natur e of indigenous governance 
systems (an d so, correspondingly the values of each particular system) is quite strong and 
cannot be changed or eliminated easily. In this context, there are two types of path 
dependence whic h are relevant. Th e first type is the result of historical path dependenc e 
formed as a result of initial conditions (sensitive dependence o n initial conditions). Th e 
second type is the result of cultural values in various regions. Thes e two different, ye t 
related sources o f path-dependent lock-i n occurring in various governance systems can be 
characterized as either structure drive n path dependence o r rule driven path dependence . 
It stil l remains, however, to describe the different strengths and the fixity of 
embeddedness o f these different kinds of path dependence . 
The discussions of the power differences are quite important for the system 
transformations becaus e there are evidences of the system transformations o f indigenous 
governance structures eve n i f the indigenous values are locked in by the strong path 
dependences tha t are considered as almost unchangeable. Consequently , there should be 
differences i n the power levels of the path dependences s o that we could assume that the 
observed transformations ar e outputs o f transformations o f the indigenous values that are 
locked in by the relatively weak forms of the path dependences. Thi s assumption is 
supported by the remediability of the path dependences base d upon the typologies of the 
dependences, a s I will describe later. 
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According to Liebowitz and Margolis (2002), the path dependences ar e generally 
classified into the three types based upon characteristics of a n outcom e of the stochastic 
process, sensitivity to the initia l conditions and institutionalized historical events, strength 
of persistence and lock-in effects, and sensitivity to information conditions. Th e three 
types are called as the first-degree path dependence, the second-degree path dependence , 
and th e third-degree path dependence respectivel y (Arthur, 198 9 and 1990; Liebowitz 
and Margolis , 2002). 
... w e identify three distinct forms o f path dependence. Tw o of these 
forms - whic h we define as first- and second-degree path dependence -
are commonplace, and they offer little in the way of an objectio n to the 
neoclassical paradigm. Onl y the third and strongest for m o f path 
dependence significantl y challenges the neoclassical paradigm, and as this 
paper shows, the theoretical arguments fo r this form require important 
restrictions on prices, institutions, or foresight (Liebowitz and Margolis, 
2002). 
The value s locked in by the first-degree path dependence ar e quite similar to the output s 
in the efficient markets because the values will be always optimum or, at least, given in 
the markets (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2002). Consequently , systems with such values 
locked in by the first-degree path dependences ar e not subjects fo r reforms and 
transformations i n the current global environments since the systems with the first-degree 
path dependences wil l be always optimum and changing continuously and automatically 
as environments change. I n other words, levels of persistence and locked-in effects of 
the first-degree path dependence can be ignored for the system transformations. Instead , 
the values with the first-degree path dependences wil l be described the given 
environments or new environments o f governance systems and practices. 
The second-degre e path dependence emerge s and locked in governance values if 
governance systems emerge as sub-optimum outputs as a result of information 
inefficiencies o f markets . Th e second-degree path dependence i s very sensitive to the 
initial conditions and the historical events; however, indigenous values are locked in by 
the second-degree path dependences t o be irrational to the historical events and the initia l 
conditions because the values do not go through appropriate historical paths due to the 
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limitations of knowledge in the information inefficien t market s (Liebowitz and Margolis, 
2002).16 
The second-degre e path dependences have higher levels of persistence and lock-in effect s 
than the first-degree path dependences because the information inefficienc y wil l not be 
easily improved enough to fix the sub-optimum outcomes. I n addition, the modification s 
of the sub-optimum values are costly in markets due to costs of information and 
switching costs. Accordin g to Liebowitz and Margolis (2002), a system with the second-
degree path dependence is "regrettable" and its persistence is strong enough to require 
sufficient cost s and pains to change to an optimum system. I n addition, such painful 
correction wil l be only possible if the limitations of knowledge are removed with bette r 
information conditions in markets (Aoki 2000; Aoki an d Okuno, 2003). 
The value s are locked in by the third-degree path dependence the values are quite 
irrational outcome as a result of the serious information inefficienc y an d the limitations 
of knowledge in markets (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2002).18 I n compare to the second-
degree path dependence, values locked in by the third-degree path dependences are more 
difficult t o change so that the third-degree path dependences are frequently described 
unchangeable dependences. Thi s is because situations of the information inefficiencie s 
are worse than those of the second-degree path dependences. Consequently , 
improvements in such serious information inefficiencie s an d the limitations of knowledge 
take more time and costs even i f the improvements are not feasible under the current 
conditions. 
1 6 Th e limitation o f knowledge is also called as the bounded rationality. 
1 7 Aoki' s discussion implies important point here (Aoki, 2000). Whe n A or J equilibrium changes to P-
equilibrium, there should be an abrupt change enough to bring P-equilibrium or sub-P-equilibrium. Suc h 
abrupt changes generate the Hysteresis effects in the P-equilibrium and, therefore, make the P-equilibrium 
steady. Suc h abrupt changes will change the third-degree path dependence to the second-degree path 
dependence. I n addition, the abrupt changes and the Hysteresis effects can remove knowledge limitation 
and other complementarities because such changes and P-equilibrium improve information efficienc y and, 
therefore, modify communit y members new informatio n an d environments. Thes e create conditions for a 
system with the new second-degree path dependence to change to the optimum system. Naturally, such 
change will be costly and painful. However , one can expect such costs and pains will be reduced by 
simultaneous changes of complementarities in better information conditions . 
1 8 Th e irrational outputs are also called as the inefficient outcomes. 
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While the third-degree path dependence create s such strong persistence and lock-in 
effects enoug h to impossibly changed, Liebowitz and Margolis (2002) pointed out that 
probabilities of the changes o f values licked in by the third-degree path dependences . 
They use "remediability" of the third-degree path dependence t o argue the probabilities. 
According to Liebowitz and Margolis (2002), the remediability is supported by the basic 
characteristics of the third-degree pat h dependence. Sinc e the values as inefficient 
outputs were chosen even i f such outcomes should have been avoided because o f the 
serious limitations of knowledge in markets (Aoki , 2000; Aoki an d Okuno, 2003; 
Hayashi, 2003). Consequently , even i f the values locked in by the third-degree pat h 
dependences ar e not changed immediately by the improvements of the knowledge 
limitations, the continuous improvements of the information inefficiencies could chang e 
persistent o f the third-degree path dependences t o weaker persistent enoug h to be the 
second-degree pat h dependence tha t can be changed (Aoki , 2000). 
4-4: Hybri d Governance Theory 
In the studies of system transformations, hybridization s of various systems have been 
discussed quite intensively (McDonnell, 2002). Accordin g to the hybridization 
arguments, th e hybridizations of various systems with different historica l dependence s 
and cultural values could emerge i n the inter-related values among the systems . Thi s 
means that the hybridizations could be more feasible i f there are sufficient the inter-
related values in the various systems enough to be integrated to a certain system after th e 
hybridizations. 
For example, U.S. corporations have adapted Japanese production system such as the just 
in time production quite well because th e just in time production system has the inter-
related factors between the U.S . firms and the Japanese firms.  Th e U.S. firms understood 
the zero-defects an d the zero-inventory policies quite well because these are inter-related 
factors that have been shared as the basic values of the production efficiencies by any 
companies. O n the other hand, the U.S. firms did not adopt the keiretsu system because 
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the values of the keiretsu system were not the inter-related factors. Consequently , even if 
the U.S . firms successfully introduce the just in time system, the just in time system in 
the U.S . firms is not a convergence model but a new production model as a result of 
hybridizations between the Japanese management value s and the U.S. managemen t 
values. I n the U.S . just in time system, there are stil l indigenous values of the U.S . 
management eve n i f there are hybridized Japanese values (McDonnell, 2002). 
In the fields of the international corporate governance, such hybridization arguments hav e 
been made and supported. On e of the most representative hybridizatio n arguments wa s 
Williamson's theoretical explanations and models based upon the convergenc e 
assumptions (Williamson , 1996) . 
As figure 3 shows, Williamson (1996) described a hybrid structure a s a transition 
structure emergin g in a middle point between the market structure and the hierarchical 
structure. Sinc e the hybrid structure i s a transition structure, the hybrid structure tends to 
have all elements o f the two polar structures whil e the elements do not have regular 
effectiveness. 
Summarizing, the hybrid mode is characterized by semistrong incentives, 
an intermediate degree o f administrative apparatus, display s semistrong 
adaptations o f both kinds, and works out of a semi-legalistic contract law 
regime (Williamson, 1996) . 
According to Williamson (1996), a certain polar structure coul d be destabilized enough to 
start moving towards another polar structure. Thi s movement is called as a convergence 
process that the original structure transforms itsel f to another polar structure b y loosing 
the indigenous attributes an d acquiring new values from another polar structure a t the 
same time. Onc e the origina l structure los t 50% of the indigenous values and gained 
50% of the new values, the hybrid structure emerge s o n the middle point of the 
convergence. Consequently , the hybrid structure has all attributes i n the forms of 
semistrong modes. 
66 
Once the hybrid structure emerges , the hybrid structure los t its equilibrium due to 
continuous convergence process. Therefore , this unstable hybrid structure is eventually 
changed to another polar structure by loosing the semistrong original values and gaining 
more new values spontaneously. Then , the convergence process ends when the origina l 
structure lost all o f the original values and gained all of the new values. 
Figure 3: Williamson's hybrid governance model (The Williamson governance model) 




















Contract Law ++ + 0 
Source: Williamso n (1996), Table 4.1, Pp.105. 
While the instability of the Williamson governance model was clearly indicated by the 
hybridization process based on the convergence assumptions, Williamson also explained 
the instability in detail based upon distributions of the disturbance frequency and the 
asset specificity to a hybrid structure . 
Although the efficacy o f all forms of governance may deteriorate i n the 
face of more frequent disturbances , the hybrid mode is arguable the most 
susceptible. Tha t is because hybrid adaptations cannot be made 
unilaterally (as with market governance) or by fiat (as with hierarchy) but 
require mutual consent. Consent , however, takes time. ... Th e hybrid 
mode could wel l become nonviable when the frequency of disturbances 
reaches high levels (Williamson, 1996). 
Williamson's hybridization concepts have been widely accepted in the fiel d o f the 
international corporate governance. For example, OECD characterized an emerging 
hybrid governance structure as an intermediate system between the shareholder-oriented 
system and the stakeholder-oriented system (OECD, 1995) . McDonnell defined the 
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hybrid model as a middle point of the communitarian system and the contractaria n 
system (McDonnell, 2002). Flemin g described the hybrid structure a s a mixture of 
semistrong values of the shareholder-oriented governanc e system s and the stakeholder -
oriented systems (Fleming , 1998) . 
However, the Williamson' s concepts ar e criticized currently by scholars such as Aok i 
(2000) and Okuno (Aoki an d Okuno, 2003) who pointed out some possibility of a stabl e 
hybrid structure a s an abnormal output i n the convergence process. Especially , Aok i 
(2000) and Aoki an d Okuno (2003) gave a certain probability of the stabilizations of th e 
Williamson governance mode l based on their models of destabilizations of th e 
indigenous structures, hybridization s of the two different structures , an d stabilizations of 
the hybrid structures . 
Aoki (2000 ) explained the hybridizations between two polar equilibria called as A and J 
equilibria. Th e A equilibrium is similar to the market structure an d the J equilibrium is 
similar to the hierarchy structure o f the Williamson' s arguments. Ther e is an 
intermediary structure betwee n A and J equilibria. Thi s intermediary structure i s called 
as the sub-P equilibrium that is considered as a hybrid structure o f the Williamson' s 
discussions. I n addition the three equilibria, there is one more structure calle d as the P 
equilibrium that is considered as a stable hybrid structure, whic h Williamson did not 
consider in his discussions. Figure 4 shows transformation processe s o f both the 
Williamson governance model and the Aoki's model. 
As reader s have surely surmised from the use o f the terms "J-equilibrium" 
and "A-equilibrium," Darwinian dynamics can be used as a theoretical 
device for explaining some aspects of the formation of different prevailin g 
organizational modes in Japan and the US . Fro m this perspective, th e 
differences i n prevailing organizational modes in these two countries may 
be regarded as a result of different "evolutionar y equilibria" evolving out 
of unique historical circumstances (Aoki , 2000) . 
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Figure 4: Comparisons of directions of transformation s 
Williamson's two possible directions of transformations 
Aoki's two possible directions of transformations 
As figure 4 shows, what makes the Aoki's hybridization argument differen t fro m th e 
Williamson's arguments i s an assumption of a long-term stable hybrid structure calle d as 
the P-equilibrium that emerges afte r stabilizatio n of the sub-P equilibrium 
Under Darwinian dynamics that involve strategic complementarity , it may 
be possible, depending on historical conditions, for there to be a 
development whereby economies converge toward a stable sub-Pareto -
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In additio n to the arguments about the stable hybrid structure, Aok i an d Okuno (2003) 
argued the mechanisms o f transformations t o the stable hybrid structure. Accordin g th e 
their arguments, a  certain stable structure such as A equilibrium or J equilibrium could be 
destabilized enough to transform itsel f to a hybrid structure such as the sub-P-equilibrium 
if there were significan t environmental changes and confusions calle d as the abrupt 
changes. Th e abrupt changes could destabilize the current equilibriu m if the changes are 
caused by emergences of both new information conditions and new generations wit h 
different value s and backgrounds . 
Efficient P-equilibriu m exists as one of stable equilibria . Consequently, 
there is a concern i f non-Pareto equilibri a such as A-equilibrium and J-
equilibrium can shift to P-equilibrium under certain conditions Base d 
upon social structures, abrup t changes can be interpreted a s confusion s 
caused by new generations wit h non-traditional values or people with 
different tradition s i n the current equilibrium . I f such probable confusion s 
are introduced , in the long run, P-equilibrium wil l be the most likel y in the 
current equilibriu m (Aoki and Okuno, 2003: translated b y the author) . 
For example , the market structure can be highly destabilized by the IT revolutions and 
the internationa l investor s who have various historical backgrounds an d cultural values. 
Since the IT revolution keeps equally increasing levels of knowledge and information 
about corporations an d industries o f investors, the informed investors a s new generation s 
lead to a unique hybrid structure . 
While there are two hybrid conditions called as the sub-P-equilibrium and the P-
equilibrium in the Aoki' s arguments , i t is important to point out that the sub-P -
equilibrium is a temporarily stable hybrid structure to be the initia l condition of the mor e 
stable hybrid structure called as the P-equilibrium. Accordin g to Aoki , th e P-equilibriu m 
will b e quite stable sinc e several historical events and new cultural values wil l be locked-
in by the path dependences generated in the stabilization process fro m the sub-P -
equilibrium. 
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4-5: Genera l Trends of Globalization an d their Effect Upo n Indigenous Governance 
Systems 
I have discussed theories relating to the globalizations of the indigenous governance 
structures s o far. I n this section, I describe the general trends o f the globalizations of the 
indigenous structures based upon several empirical studies. 
Generally speaking, MNEs ar e seeking for more effective governance structures that 
could satisfy various demands fro m differen t investors in the global (Pound, 1995; 
Bradley et al , 1998) . Accordin g to OECD reports , a hybrid governance structure ha s 
been considered as potentially effective governance structures fo r the MNEs (Guillen , 
2000). 
The OEC D report s described the current trends towards the hybrid governance structure s 
in the large MNEs. Generall y speaking, the hybrid systems tend to acquire values and 
attributes o f both the market-driven structures and the relationship-driven structure s 
(Guillen, 2000). Fo r example, OECD reported that the corporate governance systems 
have not converged to the Anglo-American system but shifted to an intermediate 
structure between the shareholder-oriented systems and the stakeholder-oriented systems 
(Guillen, 2000). McDonnel l (2002) reported the similar characteristics of the current 
hybridizations. Hi s report said that the hybrid structures emerged on the middle point of 
the communitarian governance systems and the contractarian governance systems. 
Fleming (1998) reported that the hybrid mode acquires mixed characteristics of the 
shareholder-oriented governance modes and the stakeholder-oriented modes. 
OECD analyze d such trend and concluded that active cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in international equity markets have created conditions that hybridizations of 
various indigenous governance structures are made. Sinc e general trends of 
deregulations and liberalizations of securities markets have given the universal values to 
various securities markets that all indigenous governance structures have to consider, 
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OECD considered the hybrid governance structures as reasonable for MNEs that 
aggressively finance their working capitals in the global securities markets. 
The OECD's repor t on corporate governance - writte n by six prominent 
managers or directors from the U.S. , France, Britain, Germany and Japan 
states that 'as regulatory barriers between national economies fall and 
global competition for capital increases, investment capital will follo w th e 
path to those corporations that have adopted efficient governance 
standards... Philosophica l differences about the corporation's mission 
continue, although views appear to be converging.' .. . the experts 
assembled by the OECD point out that convergence is not towards the 
U.S. approach but towards a middle ground between the shareholder and 
stakeholder-centered models (Guillen, 2000). 
Subramani and Henderson (1999) and Nohria (1992) also argued potential effectiveness 
of the hybrid corporate governance structures i n the MNEs. The y expected that the 
hybrid structures woul d improve organizational networks, information sharing, 
operational flexibility, and interactions among all constituencies of corporate 
governances. 
Our understanding of hybrid governance is largely drawn from a 
substantial body of qualitative research providing descriptive accounts of 
contexts of hybrid governance. Th e picture of hybrid governance that 
emerges is one of firms working together closely, each providing unique 
capabilities and resources and jointly deriving advantages that neither 
party could derive on their own (Subramani and Henderson, 1999). 
On the other hand, several scholars have doubts in the potential effectiveness o f the 
hybrid structures. Fo r example, according to Bratton and McCahery (1999), the hybrid 
structures may not be able to acquire best practices of various indigenous governance 
systems because institutionalized differences among the indigenous systems cannot be 
eliminated completely and hybridized immediately. I n addition, since several 
components of traditional governance models are tightly and complexly connected, each 
component may not be effective in the hybrid structures i f the connection is cut and 
reorganized during hybridizations. 
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While Bratton and McCahery (1999) doubted the potential effectiveness o f the hybrid 
governance structures, they pointed out that the stabilities of the hybrid structures woul d 
make the hybrid structure quite effective in the global markets. Accordin g to their 
arguments, the hybrid structures woul d be truly effective in the long-term if the structure s 
could hold the best practices of various indigenous systems that were acquired in the 
hybridization processes. McDonnel l (2002) pointed out the importance of the stability of 
the hybrid structures. Accordin g to McDonnell (2002), the hybrid structures mus t be able 
to hold the acquired best governance values from the various indigenous governance 
structures to be truly effective in the current global markets. 
5: The OECD Governance Model 
5-1: Th e OECD governance model: Emergence of a new governance structure 
As 1 have discussed so far, the corporate governance structures have been undergoing 
changes wit h the globalizations of equity markets. Whil e there have been several reports 
of such changes of corporate governance structures, a  hybrid governance structure is 
considered as potentially the most effective governance structures i n the current global 
markets. 
Such hybrid governance structure was described by OECD i n 1999 (Guillen, 2000). 
According to the OECD descriptions , the OECD governanc e model tends to acquire 
values or "philosophical differences" of both the market-driven governance structure and 
the relationship-driven governance structure (Guillen , 2000). 
Such acquisitions of the philosophical differences le t OECD conclude that the OEC D 
governance model was a result of certain convergence movements from both the market-
driven governance structure such as U.S. governance structure and the relationship-driven 
governance structure such as Japanese an d German structures (Guillen , 2000). Th e 
OECD governanc e model was shown by figure 5. A s the figure 5 indicates, the OEC D 
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governance model is an output of two convergence processes from the two different 
governance structures . 
Philosophical differences about the corporation's mission continue, 
although views appear to be converging.' .. . the experts assembled by the 
OECD point out that convergence is not towards the U.S. approach but 
towards a middle ground between the shareholder and stakeholder-
centered structures (Guillen , 2000). 
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Figure 5: The OECD governanc e model 
Shareholder-centered structur e 
[Contractarian Structure ] 
Values of the structur e 
• Marke t orientation 
• Contractua l aspects 
• Boar d independence s 
• Shareholde r welfar e 
orientation 
• Short-ter m perspective s 
Examples 
• U.S . governance model 
• U K governance model 
Stakeholder-centered structur e 
[Communitarian Structure ] 
Values of the structur e 
• Inside r orientation 
• Relationa l aspects 
• Participation s 
• Tota l welfare orientation 
• Long-ter m perspectives 
Examples 
• Japanes e governance model 
• Germa n governance model 
Certain 
Convergences to th e 
OECD governance 
model 
The OECD Governanc e Model 
Values of the structure (Valu e migrations) 
• Mixture s of Market orientation & Insider orientation 
• Mixture s of Contractual aspects & Relational aspects 
• Mixture s of Board independences &  Participations 
• Mixture s of Shareholder welfare orientation & Total 
welfare orientation 
• Mixture s of Short-term perspectives &  Long-term 
perspectives 
The OECD governanc e mode l assumes that both shareholder-centered governanc e 
structure an d stakeholder-centered governanc e structur e mov e towards the OEC D 
governance model . Durin g the movements, indigenou s values of each loca l structure ar e 
also converged and migrated to create new values in the OEC D governanc e model. i y Th e 
OECD calle d this as a certain convergence. 
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new values are maintained as hybrid values in the OEC D governanc e mode l (Guillen, 
2000). 
While the OEC D governanc e mode l assumes such value migrations, OECD di d not 
clearly describe balances o f different indigenou s values in the model. A s OECD state d 
that the OEC D governanc e mode l was a middle point between the contractaria n 
structures an d the communitarian structures, th e OEC D governanc e mode l assumes that 
the indigenous values would be balanced through the value migrations (Guillen, 2000). 
Stabilities of the OECD governanc e mode l have not been described at all . Severa l 
scholars have pointed out the lack of the descriptions of the stabilities . Fo r example, 
Bratton and McCahery (1999) gave questions abou t the stability of the model. The y 
argued that the OECD governanc e mode l would not be considered as stable unless we 
confirm level s of both optimum values migrations and utilization of the hybridized 
values. 
While the optimum value migrations have been partially confirmed by Fleming (1998) 
who foun d coexistences o f various governance value s of both the shareholder-oriente d 
governance structure s an d the stakeholder-oriented structures . However , Fleming stil l 
pointed out that the OEC D governance mode l would not be considered as stable without 
clear observations o f value utilizations in the OECD governanc e mode l to satisfy th e 
current market s requirements . 
Subramani and Henderson (1999), Nohria (1992), and McDonnell (2002) argued that the 
OECD governanc e mode l would not be effective i n compare to other governanc e 
structures i f the model would not hold wel l balance d mixtures of the indigenous values. 
In addition , they pointed out that such optimum balances woul d be achieved i f the OEC D 
governance mode l acquires and holds required governance value s from the various 
indigenous structures fo r better utilizations of the hybrid values to outperform the othe r 
governance structure s i n the global markets. 
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While these questions to the stabilities of OECD governanc e model are basically coming 
from uncertainties of optimum values migrations and utilizations of the values to 
outperform the other governance structures, the questions are also due to lacking of 
theoretical arguments which could differentiate the OEC D governance model from th e 
Williamson governance model. 
Such differentiations are very important to explain the stability of the OECD governanc e 
model because the Williamson governance model has been explained as unstable based 
upon assumptions of the convergence concepts. Williamso n described that the 
Williamson governance model would be unstable because the model emerged temporary 
as a transitions model on the middle point of the convergence process to a certain 
governance structure. Consequently , as long as the OECD governance model is 
explained based upon the Williamson governance model, the OECD governanc e model 
would not be explained as stable even if the OECD governanc e model could be actually 
stable in the real world. I  will differentiat e the OECD governance model from th e 
Williamson governance model by rejecting the convergence assumptions in this 
dissertation. 
Once the convergence assumptions are removed, I will describe the balances of 
indigenous values in the OECD governance models. Suc h descriptions include the 
optimum balances of the indigenous values and potential utilizations of the values. Th e 
optimum balances of indigenous values mean that the OECD governanc e model includes 
only necessity indigenous values for the current environments. Th e potential utilizations 
mean that the OEC D governance model can utilize the hybrid values to deal with the 
current environments. 
In the following sections , I describe the Williamson governance model to compare to the 
OECD governance model. Then , I discuss the non-convergence arguments and the 
special balances of indigenous values to differentiate the OECD governanc e model from 
the Williamson governance model. Base d upon these discussions, I build hypothetical 
hybrid models called as HIGs, which are stable OECD governanc e models. 
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5-2: Th e Williamson Governanc e Model: Unstable Hybrid Structure 
As figure 6 shows, the Williamson governance model is a transition structure in a middle 
of convergence processes and it will eventually move towards certain governance 
structures (Williamson , 1996) . Consequently , the Williamson governance model is 
neither stable nor truly effective to hold and utilize various indigenous governance 
values. Rather , the model is considered as a temporary equilibrium where mutually 
exclusive indigenous values could coexist in the semistrong modes. I n addition, such a 
temporary equilibrium would not allow the mutually exclusive indigenous values to 
coexist continuously once the Williamson governance model starts moving towards a 
certain structure. Th e Williamson governance model is, consequently, an output o f a 
convergence process that a certain indigenous structure transforms itsel f to a different 
structure by losing its own values and gaining new values from the different structur e 
simultaneously and continuously. 
To explain these points, assume that the shareholder-centered structur e i s going to 
converge to the stakeholder-centered structure . Th e stable shareholder-centered structur e 
starts moving towards the stakeholder-centered structure by losing powers of its own 
traditional values. Onc e the shareholder-centered structur e lost 50% of the origina l 
powers, the structure has obtained new values from the stakeholder-centered structure by 
50% of their original powers. I n this condition, there is a temporary equilibrium where 
all indigenous values coexist in the semistrong modes. I n the temporary equilibrium, the 
Williamson governance model exists as a hybrid model. 
After this point of the temporary equilibrium, there are two possible directions of the 
convergence movement. On e direction is to the stakeholder-centered structure and the 
other is to the shareholder-centered structure . Th e first direction means formal 
convergence shown as line B while the second direction means functional convergence 
shown as line A. 
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When the Williamson governance model moves towards the stakeholder-centered 
structure, the Williamson governance model wil l lose all powers of the original values 
and acquire full power s of values of the stakeholder-centered structure. O n the other 
hand, the Williamson governance model moves back to the shareholder-centered 
structure by regaining original powers of its own values. The new shareholder-centered 
structure is a modified shareholder-centere d structure. 
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Figure 6: The Williamson governance model 
Shareholder-centered structur e 
[Market structure ] 
Values of the structur e 
• Marke t orientation 
• Contractua l aspects 
• Boar d independence s 
• Shareholde r welfare 
orientation 
• Short-ter m perspective s 
Examples 
• U.S . governance model 
• U K governanc e model 
Power modes: Strong 
Stable 
Stakeholder-centered structur e 
[Hierarchy structure ] 
Values of the structur e 
• Inside r orientation 
• Relationa l aspects 
• Participation s 
• Tota l welfare orientation 
• Long-ter m perspectives 
Examples 
• Japanes e governance model 
• Germa n governance model 
Power modes: Strong 
Stable 
The Williamson governance model 
[Hybrid Structure: Temporary equilibrium] 
Values of the structur e 
• Mixture s of Market orientation & Insider orientation 
• Mixture s of Contractual aspects & Relational aspects 
• Mixture s of Board independences &  Participations 
• Mixture s of Shareholder welfare orientation & Total welfare 
orientation 
• Mixture s of Short-term perspectives &  Long-term perspectives 
Power modes: Semistrong 
Stability: Very weak 
Effectiveness: Wea k (Semistrong) 
While Williamson (1996) did not assume stability of the Williamson governance model, 
he gave implications for the stability of the model. Accordin g to his explanations, th e 
Williamson governance mode l could be stable only when the model could effectively 
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hold appropriate valu e mixtures in the middle point. The appropriate value s mixtures 
basically mean optimum mixtures of only necessity values from indigenous governanc e 
structures. 
Williamson described that the Williamson governance mode l would achieve the optimum 
mixtures when all values of the model could be utilized to satisfy al l requirements fro m 
four different institutiona l environments o f corporate governanc e (Williamson , 1996) . 
Williamson (1996) described the institutional environments a s follows . 
The institutional environment is the set of fundamental political , social 
and legal ground rules that established the basis for production, exchange 
and distribution. Rule s governing elections, property rights, and the right 
of contract are examples.. . (Williamson , 1996 ) 
In addition, Williamson (1996) pointed out that the Williamson governance mode l would 
be more stable i f the model could use such unique values to create organizational 
coordination and cooperation to take actions to satisfy the requirements i n the 
institutional environments . 
An institutional  arrangement is an arrangement between economic units... 
[can] provide a structure within which its members ca n cooperate .. . or 
rights (Williamson, 1996) . 
The organizational coordination and cooperation wil l be discussed later as the 
two-dimensional model of organization form and actions that figure 7 shows. 
While there are severa l examples of the institutional environments, Williamson used 
property rights , contract law , reputation effects , an d uncertainty. Propert y rights include 
(1) the right to use the asset, (2) the right to appropriate returns from the asset, and (3) the 
right to change the asset's form and/or substance (Williamson, 1996) . Th e indigenous 
values have differentiated th e property rights based upon their own perspectives. 
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The Williamson governance model faces high level of difficulty t o make organizational 
arrangements and cooperation to satisfy the property rights in different meanings because 
it is a transition structure having mixed indigenous values of the property rights. To 
satisfy different meanings of the property rights, the Williamson governance model must 
have optimum mixtures of indigenous values of the property rights to make prompt 
arrangements and cooperation in organizations to satisfy multi-meaningful propert y 
rights. 
Most discussions of property rights focus on definitional issues . A s is 
generally conceded, property rights can be costly to define and enforce 
and hence arise only when the expected benefits exceed the expected 
costs (Williamson, 1996). 
Especially, satisfying such multi-meaningful propert y rights are quite important because 
the current globalizations of equity markets have changed indigenous senses of property 
rights to more multi-meaningful propert y rights. Fo r example, U.S. structure has looked 
not only for shareholder protections but also for stakeholder protections while Japanese 
and German structures hav e had opposite situations. 
Contract law means the doctrine of a contract law regime. Th e doctrine is a base for 
regal actions and government reactions in markets. Generall y speaking, indigenous 
governance structures reflect such doctrine so that corporate actions are always lawful in 
the markets. However , the Williamson governance model might not be able to full y 
reflect indigenous doctrine because the model maintains different doctrines of two 
indigenous governance structures . 
This implies that the Williamson governance model could be stable i f the model could 
make appropriate corporate actions to satisfy different doctrines through optimum 
mixtures and utilizations of various indigenous values. Especially , this is important since 
the current legal environments of the global equity markets have been very similar due to 
several deregulations and liberalizations to achieve higher equity market efficiencies . 
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Different type s of reputations such as market reputations and organizational reputations 
influence indigenous governance structures. Th e shareholder-centered structur e is mainly 
influenced by the market reputations. Fo r example, management wh o seeks for higher 
market reputations might take shortsighted actions to maximize short-term stock 
performances b y sacrificing long-term returns on equities. 
On th e other hand, the stakeholder-centered structure considers internal reputations more 
than external reputations due to insider orientations in corporate governance practices. 
For example , managers who seek for better internal reputations in inter-firm trade might 
ignore stock performances i n markets to strengthen long-ter m business relations. 
Williamson discussed that satisfying these two different types o f reputations i s not 
possible through the Williamson governance model. However , he pointed out that the 
Williamson governance model would be able to consider such different reputations when 
the model is used in "ethnic communities" where external reputations wil l directly 
influence internal  reputations through efficient communications and interactions in the 
communities (Williamson, 1996) . 
Ethnic communities that display solidarity often enjoy advantages of a 
hybrid contracting kind. Reputation s spread quickly within such 
communities and added sanctions are available to the membership 
[Light, 1972 ] (Williamson, 1996). 
This point is important because the ethnic communities have emerged in the global equity 
markets. I n the markets, the international investors and the relational investors have built 
the ethnic communities by various traditional values creating different senses of th e 
reputations. I n addition, such the ethnic communities have been expanded through 
advanced information networks that connect the investors tightly. 
Uncertainties in business operations of MNEs and the global markets force MNEs taking 
appropriate governance practices. Suc h practices will be truly appropriate and effective 
only i f the practices are well coordinated through organizational consensus. Eve n if 
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various governance structures have had quite similar types of uncertainties due to the 
current market globalizations, keeping the optimum governance practices are stil l 
challenging for the indigenous governance structures because the various indigenous 
values in different organizations would be obstacles for the basic organizational 
consensus. 
The Williamso n governance model is not appropriate for making the organizational 
coordination and consensus to maintain appropriate governance practices. Thi s is 
because the Williamson governance model cannot specify types of the coordination and 
consensus to take appropriate governance actions because the semistrong values are not 
utilized enough to form the coordination and consensus. Eve n i f the Williamso n 
governance model could make the coordination and consensus, these are not stable to be 
bottom lines of the future governance practices because the Williamson governance 
model is a temporary model. However , in the current global equity markets, MNEs hav e 
tried to take multiple actions based upon various types of the organizational coordination 
and consensus . Thes e various types are quite similar to the coordination and consensus 
based on the semistrong values. 
Williamson (1996) explained the organizational coordination and consensus with the 
two-dimensional model of organization form and actions that figure 8 shows. 
Figure 8: Organization form responses to changes in frequency 
Frequency of Disturbances 
Kl Asse t Specificity K 2 
Source: Williamson (1996). Pp.117. Figur e 4.3. Modifie d by the author. 
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According to this model, the organizational coordination and consensus are depending on 
frequency of disturbances and asset specificity. Th e frequency of disturbances means 
levels of environmental volatilities to corporate governance. I f the environmental 
volatilities become very high, governance structures need prompt coordination and 
responses. 
There are three types of governance structures in the model: the shareholder-centere d 
model, the Williamson governance model, and the stakeholder-centered model. Eac h 
model has different values of corporate governance. Consequently , if the shareholder -
centered types of disturbances occur frequently, the shareholder-centered model will 
make the best coordination and consensus to deal with the disturbances. 
However, as figure 8 shows, the Williamson governance model is not viable if the 
frequency of disturbances are quite high. Thi s means that the Williamson governance 
model can only exist if the frequency of disturbances is low level. 
In addition , Williamson assumed that hybrid types of disturbances did not frequently 
occur. Thi s assumption is not appropriate in the current global equity markets where 
hybrid types of values and requests exist. I f w e assum e the existence of the hybrid types 
of disturbances , the Williamson governance model will b e more stable as figure 8-2 
shows. 
While current disturbances are more hybrid types and such disturbances occurs 
constantly in the current global equity markets, there is another element for organizations 
to make appropriate coordination and consensus. Williamso n called the element as asset 
specificity. 
Figure 8-2: Organization form responses to changes in frequency (Implication of 
stability) 
Frequency o f Disturbances 
K l Asse t Specificity K 2 
Source: Williamson (1996). Pp.117. Figur e 4.3. Modifie d by the author. 
The asset specificity means levels of frequencies of uses of assets that organizations use 
for the coordination and consensus to deal with disturbances (Williamson, 198 4 and 
1996). Hig h asset specificity means higher frequency o f use of a certain asset. I f 
governance structures have assets with high asset specificities, the structures tend to have 
more effectiveness fo r the organizational coordination and consensus. 
For example, even i f the shareholder-centered governance structures ar e appropriate to 
deal with the shareholder-centered types of disturbances, governance structures wit h the 
most appropriate values for the disturbances would be the most appropriate for 
organizational coordination and consensus to deal with. 
Consequently, i f the Williamson governance model has hybrid values that are quite 
appropriate in the current global equity markets, the Williamson governance model 
would be more stable due to higher levels of the asset specificities o f the values. 
Basically, to improve the asset specificity, i t is critical for Williamson governance model 
to have frequently utilized governance values in the disturbance. 
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Williamson governance model 
Stakeholder-centered Shareholder-centered 
In sum , Williamson implied that Williamson governance model would be stable (1) when 
environments of corporate governance look for more hybrid types of values and (2) if 
Williamson governance model has necessity governance values to deal with the 
environments. Whe n one of these is not satisfied, stabilities of Williamson governance 
model wil l not be assured. 
5-3: Th e Potential Stability of the OEC D Governance Model 
As I  already pointed out, stability of the OECD governanc e model has not been 
confirmed. Thi s is because of not only lack of empirical studies but also inappropriate 
assumptions to the explanations of the OECD governanc e model. Especially , as I 
described, the OECD governanc e model is still discussed based upon the convergence 
assumptions that the Williamson governance model uses. Onc e we could release the 
explanations of the OECD governanc e model from the convergence assumptions, the 
OECD governance model would be considered as stable, at least, theoretically stable. 
The non-convergenc e in transformations o f governance structures has been generally 
accepted through extensive empirical studies. As I discussed in the literature reviews, the 
formal convergences have been criticized for over simplifications of the globalizations of 
indigenous structures (Rowle y and Benson, 2002). Suc h criticisms are mainly based 
upon the path dependences of institutions, traditions, historical events, and cultures in 
indigenous governance structures and practices (Guillen, 2000). 
The pat h dependence argument s have been used to reason the non-convergences and 
potentials of hybridizations of indigenous governance structures. Accordin g to the path 
dependence arguments , the path dependences could explain the non-convergence through 
historical persistence and cultural persistence that strongly lock the indigenous values 
into certain conditions. Suc h strong preservations of indigenous values in local structure s 
would prevent convergence to different structures . 
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Based upon these generally accepted arguments an d empirical results, it is quite 
reasonable to state that the OECD governance model is not a certain convergence model 
but most likely a potentially stable hybrid structure . 
However, other issues to clarify the stability of the OECD governance model have not 
been stil l unclear. T o clarify the stability, we still have to confirm both the optimum 
balances of indigenous values and the potential utilizations of the indigenous values. 
These issues wil l be explained quite well once we have explanations of how the OEC D 
governance models obtain and stabilize different indigenous values that the current 
environments require. Mechanism s of value acquisitions and maintenances based upon 
typologies of path dependences would explain the issues. 
The typologies of the path dependences by Arthur (1989 and 1990) and Liebowitz and 
Margolis (2002) argued potential modifications of locked-in values of indigenous 
structures. Accordin g to Liebowitz and Margolis (2002), local values with the second-
degree path dependence woul d be modified and transformed to new values. I n addition, 
such values with the third-degree path dependence woul d be modified to the second-
degree path dependence s o that the values could be actually transformed to new values. 
Such "remediability" of path dependences has explained potential stabilities of hybrid 
structures (Liebowit z and Margolis, 1999) . The remediability allows locked-in values in 
the indigenous governance structures to change to new values and to accept various 
indigenous values from differen t governance structures . 
Aoki (2000) and Aoki and Okuno (2003) discussed possible conditions that the locked-in 
values could be changed to new values and accept different indigenous values. After th e 
changes and the acceptances, new values mixtures would be stabilized in the possible 
conditions. The y argued that values could be hybridized when there are abrupt change s 
and following confusions by new information conditions and new generations wit h 
various values and/or familiarities to different cultures . Afte r the value hybridizations by 
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the remediability, these changes and confusions would possibly create certain semi-
equilibria where mutually exclusive indigenous values could coexist as hybrid values for 
a lon g period of time. The y called the semi-equilibrium as sub-P-equilibrium. Th e sub-
P-equilibrium would be continuously stabilized by new path dependences o f the hybrid 
values to be more stable P-equilibrium. I n the P-equilibrium, the hybrid values would be 
held because the values are tightly locked-in the hybrid structures . 
These arguments ar e quite theoretical. However , the current market globalizations have 
brought such new generations into indigenous markets. Thes e new generations have 
shaken the indigenous governance structures by asking the indigenous governance 
practices different requests, perspectives, values, and cultural senses enough to cause the 
abrupt changes and confusions. I n addition, the IT revolutions support the generation s 
through efficient information networks and advanced information technologies. 
Consequently, conditions of Aok i (2000) and Aoki and Okuno (2003) for stabilizations of 
hybrid structures hav e actually occurred. 
While conditions for the value migrations have been quite satisfied, there are stil l two 
issues to be clarified to ensure the potential stability of the OECD governanc e model. 
One i s the remediability of the path dependences o f indigenous governance values. The 
other is equilibration o f the remedial values with better asset specificity a t the end of 
hybridizations. To clarify these issues theoretically, I built hypothetical models of the 
remediability and the equilibrations of the indigenous values with different path 
dependences. Tabl e 3 shows the hypothetical model. 
The hypothetica l models reflect fundamental characteristics of the remediability and the 
equilibrations that have been discussed by the typologies of path dependences . 
Consequently, the model describes the remediability and the equilibration of each one of 
three types of path dependences . 
The first-degre e path dependence i s named as normal equilibrium. Indigenou s values 
with the first-degree path dependences wil l be continuously changing as environments 
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change. Whil e the values keep changing, new values will be equilibrated in optimum 
conditions because suc h changes ar e given environments that have strong forces to be 
optimum. N o matter what conditions of information efficiency are , the new values would 
be always optimum as long as the changes follo w suc h strong environmental changes 
(Liebowitz and Margolis, 199 9 and 2002). 
Consequently, the hypothetical model assumes tha t indigenous values with the first-
degree path dependences wil l be normally and easily equilibrated as strong forces of new 
external environments lead the remedial processes o f the indigenous values. Such strong 
external environments are the market globalizations, deregulations, and the IT 
revolutions. 
The second-degre e pat h dependence i s named as partial equilibrium. Th e partial 
equilibrium means that indigenous values with the second-degree pat h dependences ca n 
be changed to new values while such changes migh t not be complete. Suc h partial 
remediability of the indigenous values is based upon fundamental natures of the second-
degree path dependences . 
Under inefficient information conditions, equilibria tend to be sub-optimum. Suc h 
situations create the second-degree pat h dependences. Whil e the second-degree pat h 
dependences ar e sub-optimum, the dependences ten d to have strong lock-in effects t o 
indigenous values as long as such sub-optimum equilibria are kept. 
However, once information inefficiencies are remedied via the incorporation of new 
information technologie s and the available of knowledge which those technologies 
provide, the possibility then exists that such sub-optimum equilibria can be avoided in 
favor o f more optimal equilibria. Onc e the new information technology is incorporated, 
change can begin as a transformational process at the outset of the introduction of th e 
technology (i.e., while it may take some time for the corporation to reach new equilibria, 
performance shoul d begin soon after the technology is introduced). 
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These discussions well reflec t the partial equilibria for the following two reasons. On e is 
that the existing indigenous values with the second-degree pat h dependences ar e not 
completely changed due to strong historical dependences. N o matter what external 
environments are appropriate for the changes o f the second-degree path dependences, no 
one can completely change the historical dependences. Th e other is that new equilibria 
would be stil l sub-optimum even i f better information efficiencies and knowledge exist to 
remedy the second-degree path dependences. Thi s is because o f the assumptions o f the 
information inefficiencie s in the real world. 
Currently, advanced information technologies and worldwide information networks have 
improved information inefficiencies in the global markets. Suc h better information 
conditions have also expanded levels of knowledge of the international investors. A s a 
result, in the global markets, such informed international investors started demanding 
MNEs thei r own interests and requests based upon their own values. Whe n the 
international investors have sufficient financial powers, they have even forced MNEs t o 
change the MNEs ' governanc e values to satisfy their demands. 
The third-degre e path dependence i s named as non-equilibrium. The non-equilibrium 
reflects the fundamental nature of the third-degree path dependence that the indigenous 
governance values with the third-degree path dependences woul d not be changed because 
the third-degree path dependences ar e considered as non-remedial (Liebowitz and 
Margolis, 199 9 and 2002). 
The indigenou s governance values are locked-in by the third-degree path dependences if 
the values were generated by historical events and cultural preferences. Differen t from 
the values with the second-degree path dependences, companie s will maintain these 
indigenous values no matter what the external environments are changing because th e 
values have been the core values of their business conducts and governance practices. 
For example , the relational values would be maintained in both Japanese and German 
corporations because the relational values are fundamentals fo r companies. 
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Consequently, corporate governances in the two nations tend to consider the contractarian 
values as additional values to the relational values. I n other words, Japanese an d German 
firms try to extend the relational values enough to acquire the contractarian values. 
Such extensions are sometimes considered as the remediability of the third-degree path 
dependence.20 However , since there have not been established and generally accepted 
arguments about the remediability of the third-degree path dependence, I  consider the 
extensions of the third-degree path dependences ar e different from the remediability. 
Table 3: Three equilibriums in the hypothetical model of the remediability and 
equilibrations 
Normal Equilibriu m Partial-equilibrium Non-equilibrium 
(1s t degree path dependence) (2nd degree path dependence) (3rd degree path dependence) 
A • Give n conditions • Remedia l conditions • Non-remedia l 
(normally optimum) • Difficul t t o change conditions 
• Eas y to change • Examples : New • Impossibl e to 
• Examples : values and requests change 
Environmental in and for • Examples : 
changes around indigenous Historical event s 
indigenous structures. and cultures in 





Three hypothetical equilibria in the model of posited remediability are visualized in 
figures 9, 10 , and 11 . Thes e drawings of hypothetical paths to equilibration have been 
constructed within the framework of Williamson's model, primarily because the current 
OECD governance model drew its foundation from Williamson' s framework. 
2 0 Forgettin g curve concepts are potentially effective tools to explain the remediability of the third-degree 
path dependences. 
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The normal equilibrium is shown in figure 9 . Th e normal equilibrium is conceptualized 
as a complete transition from indigenous values to the values o f the OEC D governanc e 
model. Here , two polar governance structure s are considered . 
As I  have previously hypothesized, indigenous values with the first-degree pat h 
dependence are equilibrated naturally and completely in the OEC D governance model . 
For example , globalization, deregulation, and the liberalization o f equit y markets hav e 
created quit e new and unfamiliar market conditions . T o deal with such conditions, both 
the market structure and the structure of corporate hierarchie s need to acquire and keep a 
number o f new governance value s which typify these new markets. A s a result o f thi s 
kind o f process , the new corporate value s are identical for both indigenous governanc e 
structures because these values do not exist in either case until globalization creates the 
unavoidable need fo r their adoption. Consequently , i f the new values which are acquired 
are retained i n the two indigenous structures and i f they occur solely as the result of 
globalization, the new corporate value s would be identical to the initia l conditions of the 
OECD governance model . 
Figure 9: Hypothetical conceptualizations o f equilibrations: Normal equilibrium 
OECD model 
Market Structure Hierarchy Structure 
The hypothesized concept o f a partial equilibrium is shown in figure 10 . Th e partial 
equilibrium is conceptualized as a transition from indigenous values to the values of the 
OECD governanc e mode l where equilibration is incomplete. Suc h partial transitions stil l 
involve the modification of indigenous values . However , the partial equilibrations are 
not the same as the modifications described in figure 9, because partial equilibration 
locks in the partially equilibrated values as new values rather than the ful l transforme d 
values of the full y develope d OEC D governanc e model . Thes e partial equilibrations wil l 
lead to new corporate governanc e forms , however the new values wil l b e limited by both 
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second-degree an d third-degree path dependencies. Becaus e the indigenous values which 
are locked-in by second and third degree path dependence ar e combined with the new 
(OECD) values which are generated durin g the partial equilibration process, a greater 
measure of original, indigenous values would retained in the new values than are retained 
in the OECD governance model. Thi s is illustrated by the two different colors used in 
figure 10. 
As an approximation of the process of partial equilibration, half of the OECD governanc e 
model has been filled-in wit h a gray color, indicating the stronger influence of market 
values (along the lines of those in the OECD governance model) in the local corporate 
governance structures after the equilibration has taken place. Th e other half is filled-i n 
with a white color indicating the retention of stronger hierarchical values in the loca l 
governance structure than those predicted by the OECD. A  similar structure obtains 
with respect to hierarchical values. 
Figure 10 : Hypothetical conceptualizations of equilibrations: Partial equilibrium 
The failure to reach a new equilibrium is shown in figure 11. Thes e non-equilibrium 
solutions (or in the language of Stuart Kauffman, th e "sticking points" on Brian Arthur's 
"multiple sub-optimal equilibria") are conceptualized as failures of the transition of 
indigenous values to the OECD governance model. I n general this failure is anticipated 
as the result of indigenous values being tightly locked-in by third-degree path 
dependences. A s an interesting aside, while I have been looking at the formal , organized 
corporate sector, it is also possible that there will be a variety of situations which might 
give rise to a dual governance structure. Tha t is, the formal , corporate sector might 
equilibrate to either a complete (OECD) set of new, market values or to a partial 
equilibrium such as that shown in figure 5, while other sectors of the economy (i.e., small 
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business, grey-market or other traditional segments o f the economy) might be locked into 
existing, inefficient indigenous values. Whil e such a discussion is beyond the scope of 
the present analysis , it could provide a fruitful are a of study in the future . 
To return to figure 11 , one example of path dependent lock-i n would be where the 
relational values in the hierarchy structure continue to be held no matter how the 
environment changes, because these values are third-degree path-dependent . I n this case 
we might think of what would happen in two different countrie s where both the 
Hierarchy structure an d the Market structure ar e locked in by third degree path 
dependence. Suc h strong dependencies woul d lock-in relational values even where the 
hierarchy structure has acquired and kept some values from the market structure . Th e 
difference between this kind of situation and the partial equilibration discussed above is 
that in the situation of partial equilibration there is some change among previously 
existing values. Unde r conditions of third degree path dependence, existin g values 
cannot be chanced at all . Som e new values, largely peripheral, might be capable of being 
introduced to the system, but the established values wil l no t change at all as a result of 
such introductions. Fo r example, a system with deeply locked in relational values might 
add a beneficial ownership disclosure clause to prospectuses fo r corporate equity 
offerings. However , the equity offering might still be limited entirely to relational 
partners who are already established in a cross-shareholding arrangement. Thus , while 
there might be some symbolic progress towards the OEC D governance model, the actual 
arrangements betwee n shareholder and stakeholder would not change at all . Th e non-
convergence o f this model is shown below in figure 11. 
Figure 11 : Hypothetical conceptualizations of equilibrations: Non-equilibrium 
Market Structure Hierarch y Structure 
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Based upon these hypothetical models of remediability and the three kinds equilibration 
discussed here, in the next section, I will discus s the potential stability of the OEC D 
governance mode l following the adoption and completion of the various possible 
hybridizations of indigenous values and explain how this relates to the proposed HIGs . 
5-4: Th e HIG as the Stable OECD Governance Model 
Based upon several hypothetical models that I showed in the previous sections, I pointed 
out that there should be two different OEC D governance model s for the two polar 
structures. T o explain the current hybridizations forming the OEC D governance model 
more detail, I developed two hypothetical hybrid governance model s called as HIGs. Th e 
HIGs are also stable OEC D governance model s that consider both the remediability and 
the three equilibrations of indigenous values of two polar structures o f corporate 
governance. Sinc e the OEC D governance mode l has been generally described as a 
hybrid model between the contractarian governance structur e an d the communitarian 
governance structur e (Guillen , 2000), the HIGs use U.S. governance structur e a s the 
contractarian structure an d Japanese and German governance structure s a s the 
communitarian structures. 21 
As table 4 indicates, the HIGs have identical normally equilibrated elements a s the initia l 
conditions. Thes e conditions are liqui d securities market, market globalizations , and 
information networks through advanced information technologies. Thes e identical 
conditions have been widely and generally observed in the current marke t globalizations. 
2 1 Japanes e and German structures have been considered as communitarian models based upon fundamental 
values such as relational values and stakeholder orientations while U.S. structure has been considered as 
contractarian model based upon market values and shareholder welfare orientations (Bradley et al, 1998). 
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Table 4: Basic structure of the hypothetical model of remediability and equilibrations of 
indigenous values of U.S., Japanese, and German structures 
HIG fo r U.S.A HIG fo r Japan/German y 
Normal equilibrium Liquid market, marke t 
globalizations, Networks 
through IT. 
Liquid market, marke t 
globalizations, Networks 
through IT. 
Partial equilibrium Relational Values such as 
long-term planning, long-
term business relations , and 
continuous collaborations 
with allies (stockholders). 
Market Values such as 
shareholder protections , 
shareholder wealt h 
maximizations, and quarterly 
profit maximization . 
No equilibriu m Market Values such as 
shareholder protections , 
shareholder wealth 
maximizations, and quarterly 
profit maximization . 
Relational Values such as 
long-term planning, long-term 
business relations , and 
continuous collaborations with 
allies (stockholders). 
However, each HIG has different partiall y equilibrated values and non-equilibrated 
values because of different condition s of the remediability and the equilibrations of the 
path dependences of indigenous values in each indigenous governance structure . 
Basically, in the HIGs , I specified such values fitting to each category based upon curren t 
empirical studies i n the three countries. 
Emergences o f the relational investors and the market globalizations have influenced 
U.S. structure significantly because the relational investors, from the market-driven point 
of view, force long-term perspectives i n planning and participations to the U.S . structure 
(Bhagat et al , 2002). 
In the last decade, a  substantial academic and popular literature has argue d 
that American corporations focus too much on near-term profitability , and 
that their long-term performance migh t improve if they had long-term 
investors ("relational investors"). .. . One potential advantage of a 
governance structure in which more firms have relational investors derives 
from concerns that managers and shareholders ma y focus excessively on 
short-term profitability , with a resulting cost in long-term performance. .. . 
Relational investing could also serve as a substitute for, or complement to , 
the market for corporate control . .. . Relational investors could both 
provide monitoring in normal times (when a firm  is not performing badly 
enough to warrant a  hostile takeover bid), an d act as a counterweight t o 
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management's incentives to block value-enhancing control change s 
(Bhagat et al, 2002). 
The market globalizations have also facilitated the board globalizations of U.S . 
corporations because the firms have had foreign investors as a result o f thei r aggressiv e 
financings in the global equity markets and operations i n the global product markets. Fo r 
example, currently, more than 23 percent o f the U.S . corporation s have had three or more 
foreign directors (Esser, 2001). H e argued that the board globalizations are advantageou s 
to reduce cost s of capital and improve strategic action s in the global markets onl y if the 
U.S. governanc e structur e ca n be tolerant fo r different value s and opinions from the 
foreign directors . 
Japanese corporations have maintained the insider orientations i n their directorships and 
promotions even i f pressures towards the market orientation have become much stronge r 
in the globalizations (The corporate managemen t an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . 
Japanese firms will keep the inside r orientations by treating the outsiders i n very 
symbolic way such as corporate spokesperson s o r images of good organizational 
restructurings whe n Japanese companies invite the outsiders to satisfy the values o f th e 
market orientations (MITI , 2003). 
German structure maintain s the insider orientations because legal enforcements suc h as 
the German corporate acts will suppor t the employee-oriented board compositions, board 
structures, an d corporate-wide decisions in the German governance structur e (Suzuki , 
1999; GPC , 2002) . 
Majority o f Japanese firms have stil l valued the stable business relationships with allies 
(The Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997) . Fo r example, Japanese 
corporations maintain continuous business relationships with the main banks by changing 
their long-term relationships from financial relationships to pure business relationships . 
For example , several main banks have begun business consulting for Japanese 
corporations wit h their experiences an d information pools (Mizuho Research Institute , 
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2002) . Japanes e corporations have reformed the long term relationships with keiretsu 
members b y establishing more business oriented transactions an d collaborations (MITI , 
2003) . 
German structure maintain s the relational values since the German laws will suppor t the 
two-tier board structure (Suzuki , 1999 ; GPC, 2002; Mizuho Research Institute, 2002) . 
In Germany , while commercial banks have not been prime financial  resource s fo r the 
German firms,  the banks are still supporting their clients as investment bank s by offering 
information and consulting based on their experiences and information pools (Kumagai, 
2002). 
Continuous participation and collaboration will be kept in Japanese structure sinc e 
Japanese corporations stil l strongly value the insider orientations and the company 
communities. Especially, large Japanese corporations believe that they should maintain 
the continuous participation and collaborations in their organizations (Hirata, 2003). 
In Germa n structure, participation will be maintained as long as the two-tier board 
structure i s mandated b y the German corporate act s (Jackson, 2002; ECGI, 2003). 
Shareholder welfare orientation has been clearly observed in Japan and Germany. For 
example, large Japanese corporations have changed the main management performanc e 
indexes to more profits and return based indexes (Fukao, 1999; The Corporate 
management an d H RM special committee, 1997) . However , traditional stakeholder 
welfare orientation has been stil l maintained in Japanese corporations. Fo r example, 
Japanese corporations have introduced stock options to maximize total welfare. Thi s 
attitude to the stock option is also advised by major business consulting firms such as 
McKinsey (Honda , 2000 and 2002). 
Such relationships are based on return consciousnesses of the firms and the banks. (Kanamor i et al, 
1993; Federal Ministr y of Justice, 2003) 
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German structure maintains the stakeholder welfare orientation even i f German 
shareholders have asked for more stockholder welfares. Mainly , this is because o f the 
German corporate laws that respect the stakeholder welfare orientations by several 
regulations to governance systems and practices (Kumagai, 2002; Jackson, 2002; ECGI, 
2003; Federal Ministry of Justice, 2003). 
Market orientation in Japanese structure has been facilitated through motivations to better 
disclosure, active external financing, better investor relations, and effective stock options 
(The Corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997; Fukao, 1999). 
In Germany, the market orientation began in the early 1990s. During the stock market 
booming in the 90s, German investors were getting familiar with concepts and values of 
the shareholder value maximization (Kumagai, 2002; Ministry of Finance of Japan, 
2003). 
Current deregulations in Japanese markets have made the markets potentially efficient 
enough to expect market enforcements to the Japanese governance practices. Th e market 
efficiencies hav e been continuously strengthened because Japanese companies start 
liquidating equities held by the cross shareholdings to maintain assets turnovers and 
utilizations (The corporate management an d H RM specia l committee, 1997). 
German corporations have also started emphasizing on assets utilities and equity 
liquidity. While Japanese and German corporations have actively dissolved the cross 
shareholdings, they have also tried to make indissoluble cross shareholdings more 
profitable through new business relationships and governance practices (Kumagai, 2002). 
Based upon the previous discussions, I summarize governance values of the HIGs into 
ten specific values as table 5 shows. Thes e ten values are made by five values based on 
the market orientations and another five  values based on relationship orientations. 
i n n 
Table 5: 1 0 indigenous governance value s of the HIG s 
Values Regions 
Insider orientation Germany and Japan 
Market orientation U S A 
Relational aspects Germany and Japan 
Contractual aspects U S A 
Participation Germany and Japan 
Board independenc e USA 
Total welfare orientation Germany and Japan 
Shareholder welfare orientation U S A 
Long-term perspective s Germany and Japan 
Short-term perspective s U S A 
Based upon these ten values, I show basic structures o f the hypothetical models o f th e 
remediability and the equilibrations of the indigenous values o f U.S. , Japanese , and 
German governance structure s i n table 6. Tabl e 6 is made not only for the specifications 
but also for the fiel d study . Eac h specified value will be checked through questionnaires . 
The normally equilibrated values are the current conditions that both U.S. governanc e 
structure an d Japanese and German structures hav e faced. I n the HI G fo r U.S.A., th e 
partially equilibrated values are reflecting the relational values that U.S. structur e does 
not have originally . Consequently, these values could be acquired and adapted throug h 
hybridizations to the HIG . Th e non-equilibrated values are reflecting indigenous values 
of the U.S . governanc e structure . Thes e are maintained strongly throughout th e transition 
to the hybrid structure. 
In th e HI G fo r Japan/Germany, the partially equilibrated values are reflecting the 
contractarian values that Japanese and German structures d o not have originally . 
Consequently, these values are acquired and adapted i n hybridization process to the HIG . 
The non-equilibrated values are reflecting original communitarian values o f Japanese and 
German structures. Thes e are maintained throughout th e hybridization to the HIG . 
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Table 6: Basic structure o f the hypothetical model of the remediability and the 
equilibrations of specified indigenou s values of U.S. , Japanese, an d German 
structures 
HIG fo r U.S. A HIG fo r Japan/German y 
Normal equilibriu m Liquid market , market 
globalizations, Networks 
through IT. 
Liquid market, market 
globalizations, Networks through 
IT. 
Partial equilibriu m Insider orientation 
Relational aspects 
Participation 
Total welfare orientation 
Long-term perspectives 
Market orientation 
Contractual aspect s 
Board independence 
Shareholder welfare orientation 
Short-term perspectives 
Non equilibriu m Market orientation 
Contractual aspect s 
Board independence 





Total welfare orientation 
Long-term perspective s 
To sho w differences betwee n the OEC D governance model and the HIGs, I draw the 
HIGs in figure 12 . Whil e the HI G i s the stable OEC D governance model , what make the 
HIG differen t fro m the OEC D governanc e model are levels of stabilities after th e 
equilibrations of indigenous values. Whil e the OECD governance model assumes 
mixtures of indigenous values, the HIGs assume the optimum migrations of various 
indigenous values through different equilibrations of the indigenous values for 
appropriate values utilizations of the HIG. Suc h optimum migrations are quite important 
for stabilitie s of the HIGs because th e optimum conditions directly mean both the 
optimum balances of indigenous values and the better utilizations of the values. 
From the Williamson' s point of view (Williamson, 1996) , the optimum balances of 
indigenous values and the better utilizations of the values ensure the stabilities of the 
HIGs because th e model could have higher assets specificities with frequently utilize d 
governance values in the current global markets where types of the disturbances hav e 
converged to some kind o f hybrid types. 
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Figure 12 : HIGs 
Shareholder-centered structur e 
[Contractarian Structure ] 
Values of the structur e 
• Marke t orientation 
• Contractua l aspects 
• Boar d independence s 
• Shareholde r welfare 
orientation 
• Short-ter m perspectives 
Examples 
• U.S . governance model 
• U K governanc e model 
Stakeholder-centered structur e 
[Communitarian Structure ] 
Values of the structur e 
• Inside r orientation 
• Relationa l aspects 
• Participation s 
• Tota l welfare orientation 
• Long-ter m perspectives 
Examples 
• Japanes e governance model 
• Germa n governance model 
Hybridizations 
HIG fo r U.S.A. HIG fo r Japan/German y 
Values of the structur e Values of the structure 
• Migrations o f Insider Migrations o f Marke t 
orientation to Marke t orientation to Insider 
orientation orientation 
• Migrations o f Relational • Migrations o f Contractua l 
aspects to Contractua l aspect s aspects to Relational aspects 
• Migrations o f Participations to • Migrations o f Boar d 
Board independences independences to 
• Migrations o f Total welfare Participations 
orientation to Shareholder • Migrations o f Shareholder 
welfare orientation welfare orientation to Tota l 
• Migrations o f Long-ter m welfare orientation 
perspectives to Short-ter m • Migrations o f Short-term 
perspectives perspectives to Long-ter m 
nersner.tives 
6: Field Research 
6-1: Hypothesi s and Judgments 
As I  have discussed, a main goal of this dissertation is to confirm stability of the OEC D 
governance model . Discussion s of the stabilities have done throughout thi s dissertation 
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and there are three required conditions for the stabilities: non-convergence, optimum 
balances of indigenous values at the end of the hybridizations, and potential utilizations 
of the hybrid values. 
I have supported the non-convergence through both empirical studies and non-
convergence arguments. However , the optimum balances of indigenous values and 
potential utilizations of the indigenous values have not been clarified through field 
researches while these have been theoretically explained. Consequently , the goal of my 
field researc h i s to confirm the two issues. 
For this field  research, one of the most difficul t issue s is a model building for the testing. 
For the testing, I built the HIGs as stable OEC D governance models for U.S. and 
Japanese and German MNEs. Th e HIGs are different fro m other indigenous governance 
structures because of the appropriate initia l selections of indigenous values and the 
optimum value mixtures of the required indigenous values. 
However, showing the HIGs might give prejudges and biases to samples. Consequently , 
instead of showing the HIGs, I simply asked the samples to select values of the HIGs 
based upon their own evaluations. Th e samples were asked to select both indigenous 
values to be kept and new values to be acquired for their corporate governance structures . 
After the samples selected these values, the samples were asked to choose values that 
would be utilized through advanced information technologies and networks. T o explain 
such information technologies, I gave descriptions of the information technologies and 
networks to the samples in advance. 
The descriptions are basically explanations of the vertically-horizontally-integrated 
information and interactions flows through advanced information technologies and 
networks in governance structures . Th e integrated flow s have been accepted and 
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described as an example of efficient informatio n and interaction systems in a hybrid 
23 
governance structure for MNEs . 
Therefore, once samples form optimum balances of indigenous values as the HIGs 
initially assumed, HIGs could satisfy the optimum value mixtures in the current 
environments. Suc h value mixtures differentiate the HIGs from other indigenous 
governance structures thorough such unique values that no single indigenous structure 
can produce. 
In addition, when the selected values and the potentially utilized values are quite similar, 
the HIGs would satisfy the institutional environments through better organizationa l 
coordination and consensus. Thi s is because o f better asset specificities o f the HIGs . 
Once these two issues are confirmed, I consider the HIGs as stable models. Then , I 
consider the OECD governance models as also stable non-convergence models. 
6-2: Research Method 
This research used self-administered questionnaires that were distributed to CEOs of 
large listed companies in USA, Germany, and Japan via fax. Th e questionnaires were 
faxed or mailed to Southern New Hampshire University. Ther e were two reminders 
(follow-ups) via fax. Tota l pages o f the questionnaire were six pages includin g one page 
cover letter. 
The questionnaire used fixed alternative questions and checklist questions (Zikmund , 
2000). Th e fixed alternative questions were used for question two (Yes, No, Planning to 
introduce). Th e checklist questions were used for question one and three (multiple 
choices). 
2 3 Th e hybrid structure is called as HIG or Hybrid Integrated Governance Structure. See , Takei and 
Fellman (Fall, 2002) for English written descriptions and Minowa and Miura (2002) for Japanese written 
descriptions of HIG. Se e Aoki (1998 and 2000) for potential efficiencies of vertically and horizontally 
integrated information flow s in hybrid organizations. 
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To support the field  research , the research web was launched. Thi s web contained cover 
letters, goals, contributions, questionnaires, related information, and communication 
tools. Th e web was written in three languages: English , Japanese, an d German. 
6-3: Descriptio n of Data 
For samplings, two databases in library of Southern New Hampshire University were 
used. On e was Business and Company Resources Center in the Infotrac Database . Thi s 
database was mainly used for sampling US corporations. The other one was Mergent 
Online that was used for sampling Japanese and German corporations. 
US samples were 282 N Y SE liste d corporations with more than 1500 0 employees. 8 9 
companies rejected receiving fax automatically or disconnected faxes. Consequently , 
questionnaires were sent to 19 3 firms via fax. Japanes e samples were 242 the first 
category o f the Tokyo Stock Exchange listed corporations with more than 5000 
employees. 40 companies rejected receiving fax automatically or disconnected faxes . 
Consequently, questionnaires wer e sent to 202 firms via fax. Germa n samples were 65 
listed companies with more than 3000 employees. 4  companies rejected receivin g fax 
automatically or disconnected faxes. Consequently , questionnaires were sent to 61 firms 
via fax. Bot h Japanese and German firms had tickers. Financia l institutions were 
excluded from ou r samples of three countries because they are subjected to strong 
regulations and controls and therefore woul d have fundamentally different governanc e 
structures, functions , and objectives (Laing and Weir, 1999 ; Vafeas, 1999). 
Response rates were reasonable wit h the exception of Japan. The response rate s were 
20.2% for USA, 34.4% for Germany, and 7.4% for Japan. Whil e Germany has higher 
response rate , this high rate was due to its small initia l sample size. Consequently , 
received samples for this research were 39 US firms,  15 Japanese firms, and 21 German 
firms. 
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6-4: Questionnaire s and Questions 
Each question was carefully designe d to measure specifi c values of corporate governance 
structures. Ther e are five contractarian values that U.S. governance structures have 
maintained and other five communitarian values that Japanese and German governance 
structures have maintained. Thes e values were already shown in previous sections. 
Following tables show both the questions and the values. 
Items fro m 1  t o 3 of question 1 wer e designed to see current situations of indigenous 
governance structures o f the three nations. Whil e these three items are respectively 
indicating changes and reactions in the current movements, these items are showing 
different level s of the movements. 
As table 7 shows, items from 4 to 1 0 of question 1 wer e designed to see current changes 
in indigenous governance values in U.S. and Japanese and German governance 
structures. Thes e questions initially measure tendencies of value shifts among the 
indigenous governance structures . 
In addition to the tests of the current movements, these questions were also designed to 
see the remediability and equilibrations of indigenous values with different types of path 
dependences. 
The samples were asked to select important values in question 2. Th e important values 
are what current environments request and could be utilized in HIGs through the 
vertically-horizontally-integrated information and interaction flows. A s table 8 indicates, 
each item of question 2 measures the same 1 0 indigenous values. 
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Table 7: Question 1 an d measuring values 
Qi Values Defined Values 
4 Market orientation, Shareholder welfare 
orientation, Short-term perspectives 
Respect shareholder's wealth more. 
5 Insider orientation, Total welfare orientation, 
Long-term perspectives 
Respect Employees' and corporate wealth 
more. 
6 Market orientation, Contractual aspects, Short-
term perspectives 
Willing to have international investors. 
7 Relational aspects, Long-term perspectives Willing to have steady shareholders. 
8 Participation, Long-term perspectives Willing to accept shareholders' participations 
into governance. 
9 Market orientation, Board independence Willing to have more non-executive outside 
directors. 
10 Insider orientation, Relational aspects, Long-
term perspectives 
Willing to have cross-shareholdings between 
alliances. 
Table 8: Question 2 and measuring values 
Q2 Values Defined Values 
1 Board independence, Shareholde r welfare orientation Performance evaluation of directors 
2 Market orientation Performance evaluation of executive 
directors 
3 Board independence, Shareholde r welfare orientation Definitions of tasks, authorities, and 
responsibilities o f directors 
4 Relational aspects, Participation, Total welfare 
orientation, Long-term perspectives 
Interest alignment among shareholders, 
directors, and executives 
5 Board independence, Shareholde r welfare orientation Nomination, selection, and succession of 
directors 
6 Market orientation Nomination, selection, an d succession of 
executive directors 
7 Market orientation, Shareholder welfare orientation, 
Short-term perspectives 
Disclosure 
8 Market orientation, Shareholder welfare orientation, 
Short-term perspectives 
Transparency 
9 Market orientation, Contractual aspects, Short-term 
perspectives 
Foreign investor relations 
10 Market orientation, Shareholder welfare orientation, 
Short-term perspectives 
Monitoring by shareholders 
11 Market orientation, Board independence, Shareholder 
welfare orientation, Short-term perspectives 
Monitoring by directors 
12 Relational aspects, Participation, Total welfare 
orientation, Long-term perspectives 
Mutual trust between shareholders 
(directors) and executives 
13 Market orientation, Contractual aspects, Board 
independence, Shareholde r welfare orientation, Short-
term perspectives 
Optimum board composition representing 
shareholders and their interests 
14 Board independence Board independency 
15 Market orientation Performance-based compensation such as 
stock-option system 
16 Market orientation Non-financial relationship with financial 
institutions 
17 Market orientation, Contractual aspects, Shareholder 
welfare orientation, Short-term perspectives 
Fair treatment to shareholders 
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6-5: Finding s 
As figure 13, 14, and 15 shows, the U.S. samples have changed their governance 
structures somehow. 24 15 % of the sample has implemented new governance structures. 
Some of the U.S . structure has been undergoing transition processes to new governance 
structure. While these portions are not high, at least, we could see undergoing movements 
of the U.S. governance structure. 
On the other hand, both Japanese and German samples showed aggressive movements in 
their current governance structures. 80 % of Japanese samples and 86% of German 
samples have already changed their governance structures. 20 % of Japanese samples and 
29% of German samples have moved their governance structures towards new structures. 
40% of Japanese samples and 43% of German samples have planned some changes in 
their respective structures. W e can clearly see undergoing movements of Japanese and 
German governance structures. 
Figure 13 : Current Movements (Changed) 
All samples were allowed to select three situations of the current movements. 
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Figure 14 : Current Movements (Changing) 
Figure 15 : Current Movements (Planning) 
While all three indigenous governance structure s hav e been undergoing changes, I  tried 
to see how such changes hav e influenced values of corporate governance practices . A s 
figure 1 6 shows, US samples considered international investors, steady shareholders , 
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non-executive outside directors, and employee and corporate wealth as important values 
for better corporate governance structures. However , U.S. samples have not shown high 
values of shareholder wealth, shareholder participations, and cross-shareholdings. 
Especially, the value of shareholder wealth was quite low (3%). 
Figure 16 : Balances of various indigenous governance values in the U.S. samples 
It was quite clear that the U.S . samples have tried to respect both the traditional 
contractarian values and the communitarian values for new governance structures . 
However, the samples also showed less respectful values for the new structures. Whil e 
fewer respects to some communitarian values such as participations and cross-
shareholdings are quite reasonable in the contractarian-based structures, less respect to 
shareholder welfare was a surprising result because the U.S. firms have traditionally 
focused on the shareholder welfare as a main business goal. Suc h lower respect to the 
shareholder welfare offsets t o more respects given to the employee and corporate 
welfares. 
I l l 
General characteristics o f value mixtures in the new governance structure s for the U.S . 
samples are balanced mixtures of the traditional contractarian values and the 
communitarian values. The tendencies o f the value migrations are shifts towards more 
long-term perspectives an d relational values while market orientations suc h as non-
executive outside directors and the shareholder wealt h are stil l maintained. Importanc e 
of the international investors reflects the current globalizations. 
On the other hand, as figure 1 7 shows, both Japanese and German samples considered 
shareholder wealth , international investors, steady shareholders, non-executiv e outsid e 
directors, and shareholder participation s as critical values of governance practices . 
Figure 17 : Balances of various indigenous governance value s in Japanese and German 
samples 
The samples considered, however, cross-shareholdings an d employee and corporat e 
wealth as less important values . Especially , as reflecting current movements , none of the 
sample valued cross shareholdings . 
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These results gave critical implications for the current hybridizations of indigenous 
governance structure s tha t OECD an d Guillen reported (Guillen , 2000). Mor e respects to 
shareholder wealth and non-executive outside directors are quite reasonable base d on the 
current movements to more liquid securities markets in Japan and Germany. Continuou s 
respects to steady shareholder s and shareholder participation strongly reflect relational 
values in their traditional structures. Suc h higher respects to the steadiness of the 
shareholders have been also confirmed by several professional researches (Kumagai, 
2002; MITI, 2003). Simila r to the U.S . samples, the importance of the international 
investors reflects the current market globalizations. 
Fewer respects to the employee and corporate wealth and the cross-shareholdings are also 
quite reasonable. Highe r respects to the shareholder wealth offsets t o fewer respect to the 
employee and corporate welfare. Especially , no respect to the cross-shareholdings 
strongly reflects the current dissolutions of the reciprocal equity holdings in Japan and 
Germany. 
General characteristics of value mixtures in the new governance structures fo r Japanese 
and German samples are also balanced mixtures of the traditional communitarian values 
and the contractarian values while the contractarian values seem to be more dominant in 
the mixtures. The tendencies o f the value migrations are shifts towards more market 
orientations such as non-executive outside directors and the shareholder wealth while 
long-term perspectives and relational values are stil l strongly maintained. 
In sum, as the HIGs assumed, the HIG fo r the U.S . firms and the HIG fo r Japanese and 
German firms are quite different i n compositions of critical values and conditions of 
value mixtures even though the general characteristics of value mixtures are quite 
identical. I n other words, while both U.S. structures an d Japanese and German structures 
have moved towards hybrid conditions of both the contractarian values and the 
communitarian values, these are two different hybri d models, as indicated in figure 10, 
due to the differences i n weights and importance of value compositions. Consequently, 
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the OEC D governance mode l is not a simple convergence model , but a new model with 
special values that current environments loo k for. 
While I confirmed the existence of HIGs with optimum value mixtures, I must stil l 
confirm the remediability and the equilibrations of indigenous values of U.S. , Japanese , 
and German structures. T o confirm these, I tried to see levels of potential value 
utilizations of the HIGs . 
Because there have not been the HIGs in practice, I used another hypothetical HIGs with 
efficient informatio n and interactions flows through the advanced information 
technologies and networks in governance structures . A s I had mentioned earlier, such 
information an d interactions flows are called as the vertically-horizontally-integrated 
information an d interactions flows . 
Such levels of the potential utilizations are critica l for stabilities of the HIGs because the 
HIGs are expected to be effective fo r optimum values mixtures for better governance 
performances. Consequently , the HIGs with such optimum value mixtures wil l no t be 
quite stable when such values are not utilized in the models. I n addition, such value 
utilizations mean continuous maintenances o f critical values in optimum conditions in the 
HIGs. 
As figure 1 8 shows, U.S. samples answered that values of comprehensive monitoring by 
both shareholders an d directors could be significantly utilized . Thi s means great 
extensions o f traditionally high transparencies o f the U.S . governance practices through 
higher monitoring by outside directors and efficiencies of markets t o solve serious 
information asymmetr y and agency problems. 
Potential utilizations of values of director nomination and succession process coul d solve 
unbalanced power distributions among main constituencies o f governance. Sinc e such 
unbalanced power distributions have been inheren t problems o f the U.S . governanc e 
practices, overall governance performance s wil l be improved by the HIG . 
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Figure 18 : Potential Utilization of Indigenous Values : US samples 
While such unbalanced power distributions would be more normalized in the HIG , th e 
values of fair treatments of shareholders hav e been strongly maintained. Thi s means that 
the normalized power distributions in the HIG do not sacrifice importance of equity 
holders as traditional communitarian governance structure s with more balanced power 
distributions have sacrificed. 
Values of transparencies woul d be utilized quite well. Thi s would make the traditionally 
high levels of transparencies fa r greater. Wit h the values of monitoring, potential 
utilizations of transparency value s would significantly improve indigenous U.S . 
governance practices . 
Performance evaluation of directors and executives, clearer task definitions of directors, 
disclosure, foreign investor relations, optimum board composition, and performance -
based compensation were considered as reasonably utilize d values in the HIG . 
I l l * 
U.S. samples thought that newly acquired values such as interest alignment among the 
three governance constituencies and mutual trusts could be utilized wel l in the HIG . 
These value utilizations indicate partial equilibrations of different indigenou s values. 
Based upon these results, differentiations of the HIG from unstable Williamso n 
governance model are confirmed in the U.S. samples. Th e HIG fo r the U.S. firms is 
stable hybrid model that utilizes both the contractarian and the communitarian values in 
optimum value mixtures. 
As figure 1 9 shows, Japanese samples answered that values of disclosure, transparency , 
comprehensive monitoring, and board independence coul d be utilized in the HIG. Sinc e 
all these values are what Japanese firms have currently looked for, the HIG woul d serv e 
the Japanese firms quite well . 
Figure 19 : Potential Utilizations of Indigenous Values: Japanese samples 
On the other hand, Japanese samples answered that values of interest alignments and 
mutual trust would be highly utilized in the HIG. Interest alignments and mutual trusts 
are resources fo r long-term perspectives and strong collaborations. Therefore , 
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maintaining these values means maintenances o f such indigenous advantages o f Japanese 
corporate governances . 
While the HIG could utilize the critical contractarian values and the communitarian 
values for Japanese firms, it is remarkable that performance evaluations , performance-
based compensations, non-financial relationship with financial  institutions , and fai r 
treatment to shareholders were considered as less utilized values in the HIG . 
These are quite important points because these values are not easily utilized in the HI G 
even i f the HIG could partially equilibrate these values. However , there are potential 
reasons fo r these results. Fo r example, performance-based evaluation s have been to be 
unsatisfied by the new mode. Japanes e firms have had difficulties t o implement the 
performance-based compensation s and evaluations. Wit h these difficulties, Japanese 
samples have been skeptical to the implementation of the performance-base d 
compensations and evaluations. However , as Japanese companies have starte d 
introducing the stock options as performance-based compensation s to directors and 
executives, there are stil l strong potentials in Japanese organizations to implement the 
performance-based compensatio n and evaluations structures . 
Values of non-financial relationship s with financial  institution s have been just introduced 
into Japanese organizations as deregulations of financial sector s have progressed. Whil e 
Japanese companies have considered that such non-financial relationships are new 
business relationships and ideal conditions, such non-financial relationships are stil l in 
the primitive stage. Consequently , Japanese samples are highly uncertain for the non-
financial relationship s at this point. 
Finally, Japanese samples thought that the HIG might not utilize values of fair treatments 
to shareholders whil e the samples considered shareholder-welfare orientation s ar e 
important and partially equilibrated. Again , the indigenous relational values reflect to 
this answer. Th e possible interpretation of this result is that Japanese samples consider 
shareholder welfare orientation as important while fair treatments to the shareholders ar e 
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not necessarily critical in their organizations where stil l relational values are strong for 
their business operations . 
Based upon these results, differentiations of the HI G fro m unstable Williamso n 
governance model are confirmed in Japanese samples. Th e HIG fo r Japanese firms is 
also stable hybrid model that utilizes both the communitarian and the contractarian values 
in optimum value mixtures. 
As figure 20 shows, German samples showed quite similar results to the Japanese results. 
However, German samples considered values of foreign investo r relations and interes t 
alignments as less utilized in the HIG. Thes e points need some discussions because 
foreign investor' s relations are critical for the current German equity markets whil e 
interest alignments have been strong values of German governance structure . 
Figure 20: Potential Utilizations of Indigenous Values: German samples 
Possible interpretation of the less utilized values of foreign investo r relations is that the 
foreign relations have already been satisfied through voluntary liquidations of cross-
shareholdings and shaping up their governance practices for better decisions to increase 
118 
stock values. Thes e actions were strongly supported by both German equity markets an d 
the German government . 
Possible interpretation o f the less utilized values of interest alignment s i s that German 
firms have already been giving up the values through the voluntary liquidations of cross-
shareholdings and shaping up their governance practices for better decisions to increas e 
stock values. Thes e actions have significantly reduced the values o f the alignment since 
these actions are initiall y to make footwork of decision-makings better through 
shortening time for the alignments. German governance ha s looked for such quick and 
timely decisions to catch up with global dynamics of markets an d operations . 
Based upon these results, differentiations o f the HIG from unstable Williamso n 
governance mode l are confirmed in German samples. Th e HIG fo r German firms is also 
stable hybrid model that utilizes both the communitarian and the contractarian values in 
optimum value mixtures. 
Table 9 and table 1 0 show models of the remediability and the equilibrations of 
indigenous values of U.S., Japanese, and German structures. Ther e are two categories of 
partial equilibrations because there are two different types of values that were initiall y 
considered as partially equilibrated values. Suc h differences depen d on levels of 
potential utilizations of the values. Th e two different types are respectively called as 
equilibrated values and failed equilibrations. 
While there are new values to be added to indigenous values in the HIGs, all such new 
values cannot be equilibrated completely in the HIGs due to differences i n levels of path 
dependences. Som e new required values cannot simply equilibrate and become utilize d 
even where the values are considered as critical in the HIGs. Suc h new, unmet values ar e 
categorized as failed equilibrations. 
There are two categories o f non-equilibrations because of two different level s of 
utilizations of traditional values. Simila r to the partially equilibrated values, such 
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differences depen d on levels of the potential utilizations of the values. Thes e two types 
are respectively called as utilized values and unutilized values. 
Table 9: Model of the optimum balances o f indigenous values (U.S. samples ) 




Stable shareholder s 
Employee and corporate welfare s 
Failed equilibrations of values 






Maintained U.S. values with 




International investor s 
Non-executive outside director s 
Maintained U.S. values with 





While indigenous values would have strong path dependences enough to be maintained in 
the HIGs , simple maintenances an d actual utilizations should be clearly distinguished. 
Even i f such strong indigenous values were held in the HIGs, the values would not be 
utilized i f the values have not been critica l in the current situations . Suc h maintained but 
less critical indigenous values are categorized to the non-equilibrated unutilized values. 
Table 10 : Model o f the optimum balances o f indigenous values (Japanese and German 
samples) 




International investor s 
Non-executive outside director s 
Shareholder wealth 
Failed equilibrations of values 





Maintained JPN/GER values 




Stable shareholder s 
Shareholder participations 
Maintained JPN/GER values 




Cross shareholding s 
Employee and corporate welfare s 
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Table 1 1 shows details of the HIGs based upon these findings of this field  study . Thi s 
table uses 10 indigenous governance value s that I showed in table 5 . Thes e 1 0 
indigenous values are derived from tables for measured value s that table 1 0 and 11 
showed. 
Table 11 : Refined HIGs 
HIG for U.S. A HIG for Japan/Germany 
Normal equilibrium Liquid market, market 
globalizations, Networks 
through IT. 
Liquid market, market 







Total welfare orientation 
Market orientation 
Contractual aspects 
Board independenc e 
Shareholder welfare orientation 


























Total welfare orientation 
Insider orientation 
As table 1 1 clearly shows, there are significant differences i n governance value s betwee n 
the HI G fo r U.S.A. an d the HIG fo r Japan/Germany even though both models acquired 
and maintained almost all required governance values for the current situations . 
Especially, items indicated by bold fonts are strongly equilibrated or utilized in the HIGs . 
These items make each HI G specia l so that no single structure can be the same . 
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7: Conclusion 
The indigenous governance structure s o f Japan, Germany and the United States have 
undergone significan t changes i n the last five years. A s the OEC D and Guillen hav e 
argued, these changes ar e the result of value migration towards a  middle-ground (hybrid) 
between th e more contractarian Anglo-America n corporate governanc e structur e an d the 
more communitarian Japanese and German structures (Guillen , 2000). I n this process of 
hybridization, U.S. corporate governanc e structur e ha s incorporated important Japanese 
and German values with respect t o stakeholder interest withou t giving up its traditional 
values. Specifically , modern U.S. corporate governanc e structure s ar e attempting t o 
acquire a more long-term perspective, a higher degree of tolerance fo r relational 
financing, and a greater focus on total welfare-orientation without sacrificing the U.S . 
market-orientation an d the emphasis on creating shareholder value. 
On the other hand, both the Japanese and the German corporate governance structure s 
have increased the degree to which they can accommodate th e U.S. corporate value s such 
as its emphasis o n shareholder value , without sacrificing their own traditional values. In 
particular, Japanese and German corporate governanc e structure s ar e now being modified 
to reflect a  greater degree of market orientation , the ability to accomplish short-term 
financial objectives , as well as increasing their shareholder orientation . A t the same time, 
German and Japanese corporations are working to maintain as their long-term perspective 
and their institutional history of strong relational governance int o their new models. 
In essence, thi s hybridization is not a convergence to the Anglo-American standards of 
governance. W e have seen that both systems are moving closer to a common middle 
ground, the vast majority o f researchers, a s well as institutions have rejected the common 
convergence assumption s a s put forth by Bradley et al (1998). Th e results from survey 
data with respect t o corporate governanc e an d the two different HIG s shown in table 4 
and table 5  illustrates how hybridization differs from pure convergence. Thes e 
differences ar e the result of different equilibriu m levels for each system as well as the 
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degree to which institutions and corporate actors are constrained by path dependence and 
the historical development of indigenous institutions and values. 
As we have seen, historical and cultural influences on indigenous values are not easily 
removed (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1999) . However , when second degree path-dependent 
values are forced to change (typically through the process of globalization and especially 
as a result of the globalization of financial markets ) value migrations away fro m 
traditional indigenous governance structures invariabl y take place. 
As w e have seen, the OEC D governance model of corporate governance does not 
demonstrate convergence. Rather , through the process o f ongoing hybridization, we can 
expect to see several different OEC D governance models arising as the country-specific 
hybrid systems for OECD member states. W e may even expect to see more of a role 
played by regional institutional values in the way that Austrian and Swiss corporate 
governance are heavily influenced by the German model. Thi s is expected because the 
general phenomenon of hybridization is the result of moving towards a stable middle 
ground between a market-orientation and a communitarian or purely stakeholder-driven 
orientation. I n addition, we can expect each OECD governanc e model to have its own 
distinct balance between varying indigenous values and the newly acquired hybrid 
values. 
Using the HIG (tabl e 11) , we can delimit the boundary conditions for the optimum 
balance between indigenous values and newly acquired values. Further , based on 
statistical results from the corporate questionnaires the participating corporations selected 
exactly those values which the HIG predicts . Although , there are minor differences 
between the anticipated and actual results, they are not significant. Som e of those 
differences ar e due to the differing historica l and cultural values across the countries 
surveyed, and some variation was the result of path-dependent indigenous values. 
In the foregoing study, one of the most important results was the confirmation of value 
migration and the actual utilization of new corporat e governance values very closely 
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matching the values predicted by the HIG . Further , with respect to the scope of change 
among hybrid corporate governance systems, the study demonstrates tha t the range of 
potential new values corresponds quite closely to the measured values which the study' s 
respondents characterize d as critically necessary values. On e outcome of this is that we 
can expec t the ongoing revolution in information technology and networking to furthe r 
support the adoption of OECD-type models which offer better value utilization for 
member states and member corporations. On e implication of this finding is that it is 
expected that OECD-type models will hav e superior performance compared to purely 
indigenous governance structures through more efficient asset allocations and a greater 
capability to interact with international financial an d product markets. 
Along these lines, we can expect Japanese and German corporate governance structure s 
which have not yet shifted to hybrid structures to begin that shift in the near term. Thos e 
that have already begun to shift can be expected to stabilize during the next few years. I n 
practical terms this means that the new hybrid structures can be expected to acquire and 
utilize a more market-oriented governance system even though they wil l preserve some 
of the traditional relational values of corporate governance. Thi s research has shown and 
is also supported by earlier OECD studies , hybrid structures should be both stable and 
effective i n the Japanese and German corporate systems. I n the same vein, US 
governance structures can be expected to shift in the direction of a more common hybrid 
structure. However , the U.S. hybri d governance structure is not expected to be quite so 
stable as the hybrid governance structures o f Germany and Japan. Th e reason is that U.S . 
corporate governance is still very strongly driven by short-term market dynamics and the 
need to provide quarterly income to investors. Whil e new stable hybrid forms may 
eventually develop in the United States, their stability is not yet assured. 
In conclusion , for Japan and Germany as well as for the surrounding states, we can 
predict the emergence of a cluster of related corporate governance forms, which are 
hybrid in nature and simultaneously preserve various. W e expect this kind of 
hybridization to be permanent an d unidirectional (i.e., stable). I n the U.S. , th e situation is 
less clear. Man y U.S . corporation s are stil l preoccupied with short-term financia l result s 
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and, as a result, may not be adequately sensitive to the needs of foreign investors . Ove r 
the long-run, U.S. corporation my either have to adapt to foreign cultural imperatives or 
face being shut out of many product and financial markets . Surprisingly , this study 
shows that U.S. corporations have very little planning to support the values and 
utilization o f their corporate governance structure, with change virtually always coming 
after the fact . I n this regard, the long-term effects o f employing an unmodified Anglo -
American governance system may need some serious and careful rethinking. 
Glossary 
Asset specificity: Asset specificity means levels of frequencies of uses of assets that 
organizations use for the coordination and consensus to deal with 
disturbances (Williamson, 198 4 and 1996) . Hig h asset specificity 
means higher frequency of use of a certain asset. I f governance 
structures have assets with high asset specificities, the structures tend 
to have more effectiveness fo r the organizational coordination and 
consensus. 
Formal convergence: The formal convergence refers a  complete convergence to a system 
that is absolutely superior to the other systems. Especially , when 
the convergence concepts emerged, the formal convergence refers 
complete transformations o f indigenous political and economic 
systems to the U.S. systems (Harbison and Myers, 1959 ; Kerr et al, 
1960; Guillen, 2000). Thi s idea was used to explain some 
globalizations of various indigenous governance structures. Fo r 
example, Hangman and Karaka attributed the formal convergence 
to the absolute effectiveness o f the U.S. governance structure and 
its environments (McDonnell, 2002). 
Frequency of disturbances: The frequency of disturbances means levels of environmental 
volatilities to corporate governance. I f the environmental 
volatilities become very high, governance structures need 
prompt coordination and responses (Williamson, 1996). 
Functional convergence: The functional convergence refers modifications o f their own 
governance structures through adaptations o f different 
governance functions of various governance systems (Khanna 
et al, 2001). Th e functional convergences have been 
considered as contingent movements or modifications of 
indigenous governance structures (Gilson , 2001). 
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Institutional environments: "The institutional environment i s the set of fundamenta l 
political, social and legal ground rules that established th e 
basis for production, exchange an d distribution. Rule s 
governing elections, property rights, and the right of contract 
are examples..." (Williamson, 1996) . 
OECD governance model : "Philosophical differences abou t the corporation's mission 
continue, although views appear to be converging.' .. . the 
experts assembled by the OEC D poin t out that convergence 
is not towards the U.S . approach but towards a  middle 
ground between th e shareholder an d stakeholder-centere d 
models" (Guillen, 2000). 
Path dependence: Th e path dependence i s defined as "the tendency o f corporate 
governance systems to preserve condition s that existed in the past due 
to economic or political reasons or simply due to historical accident" 
(Licht, 2001). Suc h historical accident includes both initial conditions 
and historical events (Liebowitz and Margolis, 2002; Yoda, 2003). 
P-equilibrium: "Where the optimal organization mode for each particular industry is 
applied within that industry and skill types that correspond to each of th e 
modes are employed; the A-equilibrium, where the choice of functional 
skills becomes the prevalent strategy regardles s o f industry; and the J-
equilibrium, where the formation of malleable / contextual skill s 
becomes the prevalent strategy regardles s o f industry. Th e economic 
gains derived from the diversity of organizations can be maximized at 
the P-equilibrium" (Aoki, 2000). 
Remediability: "Williamson [1993b: 140 ] introduces the term 'remediability ' to refer to 
the circumstance in which known feasible and preferable alternative s 
exist. He argues that it is necessary t o establish remediability in this 
sense, in making any claim that an allocation is inefficient. Demsetz 
1973, Coas e 1964 , Calabresi 1968, and Dahlman 1979 have mad e 
similar points" (Margolis and Liebowitz, 2003). 
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